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Abstract: This study presents estimates that social networks exert causal and substantial influences
on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. The study explicitly allows for the possibility that social
networks are not chosen randomly, but rather that important characteristics such as unobserved
preferences and unobserved community characteristics determine not only the outcomes of interest
but also the informal conversational networks in which they are discussed.  Longitudinal survey data
from rural Kenya on family-planning and AIDS are used to estimate the impact of social networks
while controlling for their unobserved determinants. There are four major findings: First, the
endogeneity of social networks can substantially distort the usual cross-sectional estimates of network
influences.  Second, social networks have significant and substantial effects even after controlling for
unobserved factors that may determine the nature of the social networks. Third, these network effects
generally are nonlinear and asymmetric.  In particular, they are relatively large for individuals who
have at least one network partner who is perceived to be using contraceptives or or to be at high risk
of HIV/AIDS, which is consistent with S-shaped diffusion models that have been emphasized in the
literature.  Fourth, the effects of networks are not confined to the use of family planning by women,
the focus of much of the literature on networks in demography, but appear to be more general,
influencing responses to HIV/AIDS, and influencing men as well as women.  
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate empirically and convincingly that a different picture of the
dynamics of social change emerges if individuals are considered not in isolation, but as members of
social networks.  To achieve this goal requires unusual data as well as the use of  recent advances in
techniques of  modeling that permit making causal inferences from observational data. We thus exploit a
longitudinal data set consisting of repeated measures of social networks and individual attitudes and
behavior over time, and use statistical models that take into account the possibility that the choice of
network partners is neither random nor fully exogenously determined, but is influenced by factors that
are not observed in the data.
Although the fathers of social science in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
deeply concerned with the relationship between the individual and the group (e.g. Durkheim, Marx, the 
Chicago School in Sociology, Veblen), by the 1950s the focus of social scientists was on individuals.  
An explosion of individual- and household-based cross-sectional surveys and the development of high
speed computers facilitated analyses of information on individuals abstracted from their social setting
and protected from the passage of time.  Individuals were questioned about their own attributes and
attitudes, and one variable was related to others measured at the same time.  To the extent that the social
setting was captured, it was primarily in terms of administrative boundaries such as nations or cities. 
More recently, however, there has been an increase in attempts to understand the influence of  settings
that are more local, and perhaps more meaningful to women and men as they proceed day-to-day through
their lives, such as their local communities and their personal networks. The literature that presents these
attempts has considered social change through the mechanism of the diffusion of innovations (Rogers
and Kincaid 1981; Coleman, Katz and Menzel 1966; Strang and Tuma 1993), the existence of thresholds
or tipping points that lead to a divergence in the dynamics of collective and individual decision
processes (Schelling 1978; Gladwell 2000, Valente 1994), and the roles of social networks that lead to
embedded social actors (Granovetter 1973; Burt 1992). Among the more vibrant related research areas
are those of demographers studying diffusion (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Montgomery and Casterline
1996; Entwisle et al 1996; Kohler 2000a, 2000b, forthcoming; Kohler, Behrman and Watkins 2000;
Axinn and Yabiku 2001), attempts by sociologists to modify rational actor models by embedding the
actors in a social context (Granovetter 1973; Coleman 1986; DiMaggio 1997; Smelser and Swedberg
1994), and attempts by economists to incorporate the effects of neighbors and neighborhoods into
individualistic neoclassical models (Borjas 1995; Brock and Durlauf 2001; Duncan and Aber 1997).  
Persuasive empirical studies on the consequences of social networks for attitudes and behavior are
rare, however, for at least two reasons.  First, because contemporary social scientists have typically
treated individuals as if they were social isolates, they have not routinely collected data on social
networks.  Second, even when measures of social networks are available, it is difficult to establish causal
relations convincingly. A critical problem is that characteristics of an individual and her social setting
may influence her attitudes and behavior, but also her choice of community and personal network. Thus,
any similarity between the attitudes and behaviors of individual actors and their network partners may1 A few examples include Angrist (1990), Angrist and Krueger (1992), Alderman, Behrman, Lavy and Menon
(2001), Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), Behrman and Deolalikar (1990), Behrman, Foster and Rosenzweig (1997),
Behrman, Foster, Rosenzweig and Vashishtha (1999), Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999, 2001), Behrman, Rosenzweig
and Taubman (1994, 1996), Behrman and Taubman (1976), Behrman and Wolfe (1987, 1989), Budig and England
(2001), Conley and Bennett (2000), England, Farkas,  Kilbourne and Dou (1988), Foster and Rosenzweig (1994, 1995,
1996), Kohler, Skytthe and Christensen (2001), Jasso (1985), Pitt, Rosenzweig and Gibbons (1993), Rosenzweig and
Schultz (1983, 1987), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986, 1995).
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not reflect social influences, but constitute merely a reflection of  similar determinants of behavior
(Manski 1993). While this problem is sometimes acknowledged, few studies have addressed it explicitly. 
A focus on neighborhoods, communities or networks thus raises general problems of establishing
causality in a particularly acute form. It is reasonable to assume that actors have more choice in the
selection of their work and residential communities or in the selection of people with whom they discuss
matters important to them than in their choice of their age, gender, race or even class. Causal inferences
obtained from standard statistical models that include these latter characteristics are therefore tenable
because these characteristics are unlikely to be determined by unobserved factors that influence the
outcome variable of interest and simultaneously the key explanatory variables included in the model. On
the other hand, casual observation suggests that choice influences the selection of neighborhoods,
communities and personal networks, albeit under constraints that may be either flexible or relatively
constrictive.  If choice is important, then the conclusion that local social settings or networks influence
individuals is not necessarily tenable.  There is considerable evidence that neighborhoods are composed
of people who are more similar to each other than they are to those in neighborhoods with different
characteristics (Lieberson and Waters 1988; Massey and Denton 1993).  Equally unsurprising is
evidence that the choice of network partners is guided by homophily, the preference for interaction with
those much like onself (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Blau 1994; Fischer 1982; Marsden 1987; Watkins
and Warriner 2000).  If the factors that influence the choice of local social settings or networks are
available in the data, they can be controlled for in statistical models.  Often, however, they are not
observed, either because the information was not collected or because the factors are very difficult to
observe. Examples of the latter are a preference for living near those who share similar moral values that
are often difficult to articulate on a survey, or a preference for chatting with those who can be trusted to
be discreet.  If these unobserved determinants of neighborhood or peer-group choice are directly related
to the outcome variable of interest – and not only indirectly through their effect on the neighborhood or
peer-group – then standard analyses of neighborhood or peer-group effects will provide a distorted
picture of their causal relevance for individual behavior.
Statistical procedures have been developed to attempt to control for selection on the basis of
unobserved characteristics,  including fixed effects, random effects and instrumental variables.   These
have been used in many studies in the social sciences, with some practitioners claiming that standard
methods that do not control for unobserved factors can lead to substantial biases in estimation.
1  These
methods, however, are quite demanding of data.  To estimate models with random or fixed effects, for
instance, requires multiple observations of potentially relevant attitudes or behaviors.   3
Consider an example from demography, where there is currently considerable interest in the
effects of social interaction on fertility (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Montgomery and Casterline 1996;
Entwisle et al 1996; Kohler 1997; 2000a, 2000b, forthcoming; Kohler, Behrman and Watkins 2000;
Axinn and Yabiku 2001), as well as on other demographic outcomes such as migration (Massey and
Espana 1987; Massey and Espinosa 1997). To study the impact of social interaction on contraceptive use
using fixed effect models, multiple observations per individual of contraceptive use and of social
interaction are required.  Such data have rarely been collected.  To estimate models using instrumental
variables requires instruments that are convincingly related to measures of social interaction but not to
the stochastic term in the equation determining contraceptive use.  Such instruments are infrequently
available. As a result, in the few studies of social interaction and demographic behavior, analysts either
ignore the possible joint determination of measures of social interaction and fertility or qualify their
approach by mentioning the problem in passing.  
In this paper, we provide an example of the way that social interaction influences social change.  
Although our example comes from demography, our approach is relevant to a wide range of questions
about neighborhood, community and network effects that are of interest to social scientists.  In addition,
we provide what we believe are the best estimates the influence of social networks on behavior and
attitudes regarding contraceptive use and AIDS.  We use data from South Nyanza District, Kenya, where
both modern contraception and AIDS are innovations introduced in the past decade.  Important features
of these data include that they provide detailed information about the interactions in social networks
about AIDS and family planning, and that they provide multiple observations over a five-year period. In
particular, information about family planning networks, fertility attitudes and behavior are measured for
the same respondents at three points in time, and for the AIDS attitudes and AIDS social networks at two
points in time.  The data therefore provide longitudinal, detailed and direct evidence about the social
context that potentially affects individuals’ attitudes and behaviors, and such information is essential for
establishing a link between the social context and individual’s behavior and attitudes (for a recent study 
that stresses the critical importance of these aspects, see Axinn and Yabiku 2001). Moreover, our data
permits us to explore the impact of social networks while controlling for unobserved determinants of
those networks such as women’s preferences or characteristics of the communities in which they live. 
In Section 2, we present our analytic framework, which shows that unobserved characteristics are
indeed likely to affect women’s contraceptive use and their choice of network partners. For simplicity of
exposition, we develop the analysis in this section focusing on women and contraceptive use, but  the
approach is generalizable to other outcomes.  In Section 3 we discuss the context and data for our
empirical analysis. In Section 4, we compare estimates of the effect of social networks on contraceptive
use, with and without control for individual fixed effects.   We find that the results differ substantially
depending on whether unobserved fixed factors that might affect both the choice of network partners and
contraceptive use are controlled. Our preferred estimates indicate that the causal effects of social
networks on contraceptive use are significant and substantial (and larger for men than for women) even
with our controls.  Alternative specifications of key variables and other tests suggest that these results2 See Entwisle, et al. (1996), Entwisle and Godley (1998),  Kohler, Behrman and Watkins (2000, 2001),
Montgomery and Casterline (1993, 1996), Montgomery and Chung (1994), Munshi and Myaux (2000), and Valente, et
al. (1997).  In Kohler, Behrman and Watkins (2001) we allow for the number of network partners to be correlated with
unobserved factors in the disturbance term and control for that possibility by considering only respondents with three or
four network partners.  But we assume in that study that network characteristics (namely, network density) is independent
of factors in the error term for the contraceptive use relation.  One exception in the work underway by Montgomery, et al.
(2001) that was presented at the PAA 2001 meetings, but for which we have seen only some of the preliminary tables, not
the paper per se.
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are robust.  In Section 5, we present similar estimates in an analysis of the influence of network partners
on the degree to which a respondent considers herself or himself to be at risk of AIDS.  In Section 6, we
conclude that social networks have effects on fertility- and AIDS-related attitudes and behaviors, and
that this study provides what are currently the best available estimates of the magnitude of these effects.
SECTION 2: ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK, EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION, AND
ESTIMATION ISSUES
 The choice of empirical specifications and estimation methods with which to examine the
possible impact of social networks on contraceptive use is influenced by analysts’ assumptions about the
process through which networks are formed, though often these assumptions appear to be conditioned
strongly by data and software availability.  The approach used in the demographic literature is to assume,
usually implicitly, that it is acceptable to treat networks as if they were formed randomly.
2  That is, it is
assumed that there are no unobserved characteristics of the women such as their preferences, no
unobserved prices, no unobserved community characteristics, etc., that affect contraception use directly
and that also are correlated with the empirical representation of their social networks.  There are two
reasons to expect that these assumptions are often violated: 1) the reported characteristics of network
partners and the reasons respondents chose some but not others, and 2) the logic of models of fertility
behavior.  We consider each of these in turn.
Reported Reasons for Choice of Network Partners:  The validity of the statistical models that
we consider below to control for selectivity is difficult to evaluate because the basic assumptions and
predictions of these models are  rarely challenged or tested (Manski 1995; Stolzenberg and Relles 1997;
Winship and Morgan 1999; Freedman 1999; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000).  Some critics suggest that
these models can be improved by turning to “data or prior scientific knowledge” (Freedman 1999:19; see
also Manski and Nagin 1998) in order to understand the process by which decisions are made.  Thus, for
the same sample that we use in the analyses in this paper, Watkins and Warriner (2000) use household
survey data and semi-structured interviews to understand better the underlying process by which 
network partners are determined.  Their analysis of the survey data shows that the networks are relatively
homogeneous compared to networks in more economically and socially stratified countries: for example,
the respondent and his or her network partners tend to be similar in terms of their age, education, and
economic status. Other analyses show that the networks are relatively dense and network partners are
therefore likely to know each other as well as the respondent (Kohler, Behrman and Watkins 2001).
This homogeneity of networks  is undoubtedly due in part to the constraints imposed by the5
context of rural Kenya, where relatively homogenous populations live in small communities (see Section
3).  Importantly, however,  the primary criterion for the choice of network partners appeared to be a
preference for talking with homophilous others , i.e. “Women like me”.  Our qualitative data collected in
S. Nyanza District, consisting of 40 semistructured interviews with women and 40 with men, support
this, and make it clear that “a woman like me” is one similar to the respondents in characteristics such as
“whether she can keep a secret” that are not observable in our data.  
The most direct illustration of possible biases in the usual estimates of the impact of networks on
fertility attitudes and behavior is whether network partners are selected in part with respect to what the
respondent believes to be their attitudes toward or use of family planning.  If a respondent who, for
example, is considering the use of family planning, deliberately chooses to talk with someone she or he
believes has personal experience with these methods, even when the correlation between the use of
family planning by the respondent and her network partners is strongly positive, the causal direction may
not be only from the network to the respondent but substantially or even totally the reverse.  The
assumption that women deliberately select network partners with respect to their perceived use of family
planning is reasonable, and consistent with a view that as rational actors women search for information
that will help them to make decisions about fertility control.  To examine this empirically, Watkins and
Warriner drew on a set of semi-structured interviews conducted with 40 women.  They found that about
20 percent of the 40 women gave no indication about the motivation for the selection of network
partners.   About 30 percent indicated that they choose a particular woman with whom to discuss family
planning because she was believed to use family planning.  For the other half of the interviews, the
respondent made it clear that such strategic selection did not occur.  In these cases, the topic of family
planning was likely to occur as women were talking together as they walked to get water or firewood, or
sitting and chatting at home, such that even women who were not considering the use of family planning
would learn about its perceived  advantages and disadvantages.  
From these studies, thus, the process of network selection in our data appears to be dominated by
homophily, with the strategic selection of network partners because they are believed to use family
planning as a somewhat less important criterion.  But both homophily and the strategic selection of
network partners mean that it cannot be assumed that networks are chosen randomly. 
Standard Models of Fertility Behaviors with Extensions to Include Social Networks: The
standard models of fertility determination such as the quantity-quality model of Becker and Lewis (1973)
and Willis (1973) do not include social networks explicitly, though some of this literature does recognize
social influence in determining preferences (e.g., Easterlin, Pollak and Wachter 1980).  But sketching
out how these standard models might be extended to include social networks is useful; we follow
demographic convention in using women as the actors (Watkins 1993) and we focus on the use of
contraception. 
We begin with a model of fertility that assumes that women maximize their own preferences  for
the quantity and quality of their children, their own health and other outcomes that they can influence. 
We then extend this standard model by proposing that social interaction also enters into their preference6
functions: for example, a woman may enjoy social interaction in itself, she may obtain social status from
her number of children relative to that of her network partners, or she may be uncomfortable when she
deviates from the expectations of appropriate behavior held by her social group.  In addition, social
interactions may provide information about whether it is socially acceptable to use modern contraceptive
methods or the consequences of specific methods (e.g. the impact of Depoprovera versus pills on one’s
body).   Preferences differ across women; for example, given the same opportunities,  some women
choose to use modern methods of contraception while others use traditional methods, and some spend
more time in social interaction than others.
The constraints under which the women make choices can be collapsed into two groups, those that
characterize the “production” of  children and other outcomes and those that characterize the constraints
under which this production occurs:
1. Production functions: Among the production functions that form the basis for the standard fertility
model are those for births (e.g. the impact of contraceptive use on the probability of conception)
and for child quality (e.g. the impact of resources devoted to children).  Information production
functions are also relevant: they permit extending the standard model to characterize the impact of
social networks on information related to a number of behaviors and outcomes, including
knowledge of social norms regarding contraceptive use. 
2. Resource constraints: The most common resource constraints depicted in standard fertility models
are those of money and time.  Many fertility models assume a full-income (i.e., covering all
resources under the control of the women, including their time) budget constraint that incorporates
explicitly the use of the resources under the women’s control and  resources that are available to
her (which may be positive or negative, depending on whether a woman is a net provider of
resources to others or a net receiver of such resources).  The availability of resources is often
depicted as depending on market prices (current and expected in the future), but the model can be
extended such that the availability of resources also depends on social interactions in the present
as well as those that are expected in the future, such as agreement about household sharing rules
or customs and about the allocation of community resources, as well as the channels through
which resources from other households can flow.
Within this extended model, maximization of women’s preferences subject to such constraints
leads to reduced-form relations that determine inter alia contraceptive use and social networks.  Each of
these reduced-form relations includes on the right-side all of the variables that are predetermined from
the point of view of the women at the time of the current period’s decisions: all preferences, all
intrahousehold channels and community characteristics, all current and expected prices, etc.  Because
both contraceptive use and social networks are dynamic, these relations need to be updated for assets
that are carried over time (e.g., the size and composition of the groups in which such social interactions
occur may change, the number of surviving children).
From the perspective of whether a woman uses contraceptives at time t, the central past asset for
this paper is her social network prior to time t.  In our framework,  this network was established prior to7
time t and influenced by the same set of predetermined variables that affected the woman when she
made her contraceptive decisions prior to time t. Therefore many of the determinants of social networks
prior to time t are likely to be the same variables as those on the right-side of the relation determining
contraceptive use at time t because they are fixed or slowly adjusting over time (e.g., the woman’s
schooling, her expectations regarding future prices and the interfamilial and community resources on
which she can draw, the persistent part of her preferences).  
Unfortunately, most of these variables can not be observed in our or in any other data sets. 
Therefore the reduced-form relation for contraceptive use at time t as a function of the social network
prior to time t includes in the disturbance term all those factors that are on the right-side of the reduced
form for such contraceptive use, and many of these are likely to be correlated with determinants of
network characteristics prior to t.  As a result, if the estimation procedure does not control for these
unobserved right-side factors that determine contraceptive use at time t and are correlated with the
unobserved right-side factors that determined social networks prior to time t, the estimated impact of
social networks prior to time t on contraception use at time t is biased.  This is the case because the
estimated impact includes not only the causal effect of interest–here, the impact  of prior social networks
on current contraception use-- but also the effect of all unobserved factors in the disturbance term of the
equation that determines contraceptive use that are correlated with social networks determined prior to
time t.  Such a bias may be positive or negative, depending on the direction of the impact of the
unobserved factors on contraceptive use versus the direction of their impact on social networks prior to
time t.  Within this framework, thus, social networks would not seem likely a priori to be random.
Specification of Empirical Relations that We Estimate and Estimation Issues: Based on the
empirical investigations of network partners’ characteristics and the sketch of a common model of
fertility behavior that we extended to incorporate social networks, we posit that prior social networks are
not likely to be random in the sense of being independent of disturbance terms in relations for the
estimation of contraceptive use at time t.  Therefore we use an empirical specification of the relation
determining contraceptive use in which there is explicit recognition that, in addition to observed right-
side variables (including social networks prior to time t), there are unobserved factors.  A first-order
linear approximation to the linear probability model for contraceptive use under these assumptions is:
Yit = a Nit- + b Xit- + fi + eit,      (1)
whereYit is contraceptive use by individual i at time t; Nit- is the social network for individual i prior to
time t (we use the subscript “t-” to emphasize that the variable N refers to the time prior to t; we
use this notation also for other predetermined variables); Xit- is a vector of other state variables for
individual i determined prior to time t (e.g., age, marital status, children ever born, women’s
schooling, wealth); fi is a vector of unobserved fixed factors that determine contraceptive use by
individual i (e.g., the woman’s and her children’s frailties and intelligence, unobserved current
community characteristics, expectations regarding future prices and interfamilial and community
resources on which the woman can draw, the persistent part of her preferences); and eit is an
random disturbance term that affects contraceptive use by individual i at time t due, for example,3 In principal a nonstatistical way to have this correlation be zero is to conduct an experiment in which women
are assigned randomly social networks.  For this, as for many other questions in the social sciences, it would seem very
difficult if not impossible to conduct such an experiment.  But the experimental ideal is behind many recent discussions
of how to obtain estimates of causal effects from behavioral data (see surveys and discussions in Manski 1995; Heckman
1997; Heckman, et al. 1999; Stolzenberg and Relles 1997; Winship and Morgan 1999; and Rosenzweig and Wolpin
2000).
4 The use of instruments that do not satisfy one of these conditions (or satisfy the third by some arbitrary
exclusion from the contraceptive use relation) can result in estimates that are worse than those that would be obtained
without estimates.  Because many studies have apparently used such instruments, some criticize the instrumental variable
approach – rather than the inappropriate use of the method.
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to randomness in the availability of contraceptives or to price shocks that are deviations from the
long-run secular price trends.
The basic estimation problem is that the representation of social networks prior to time t (Nit-) is
likely to be correlated with the unobserved fixed factors (fi) that determine current contraceptive use. 
Social networks prior to time t Nit- are likely to have been determined by individual characteristics Xit-
and unobserved fixed factors fi, both of which appear also in the contraceptive use equation (1), and
additionally on other potentially unobserved factors ui that are uncorrelated with Xit- and eit as
represented in the linear approximation in relation (2):
Nit- = g Xit- + h fi + ui. (2)
As a result, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the coefficient of social networks, a, in the
determination of current contraceptive use in relation (1) includes not only the effect of social networks,
but also the effect of the correlated parts of the unobserved variables in (fi). In particular, in the simplest
case in which there is no  Xit- in Eq. (1), the estimate of a equals the true value of a plus the effect of fi
times the correlation between fi and Nit-.
To obtain consistent estimates of the coefficient a, which measures the impact of social networks
on contraceptive use, it is necessary to break the correlation between the term representing social
networks and the compound disturbance term including both fixed and random elements.  The two
dominant statistical methods discussed in the literature for doing so are (1) instrumental variables and
(2) fixed effects.
3
For instrumental variable estimates, the right-side variable of interest (in this case, the social
network representation) is purged of its correlation with the compound disturbance term in the relation
being estimated by using the predicted value of the variable instead of its actual value.  The identifying
instrument(s) needed for this prediction must satisfy three conditions: (i) they must be sufficiently
correlated with the representation of social networks that they are being used to predict, (ii) they must
not be correlated with the compound disturbance term in the relation determining contraceptive use, and
(iii) they must not be included in the contraceptive use relation.
4  The logic of the model sketched out
above means that fixed determinants of contraceptive use in general also are determinants of social
networks, so fixed individual, family, household, community or community variables (e.g., women’s
schooling, compound land rights, community location and environment) are not good identifying9
instruments.  Variables that are correlated over time (e.g., age, secular trends in prices, interhousehold
relations, and community characteristics) do not satisfy the second condition.  Unanticipated deviations
from such variables (“shocks”) in the past (e.g., price shocks) satisfy conditions (ii) and (iii).  It is an
empirical question of whether they satisfy condition (i). Our prior is that for the long-run decisions
related to fertility of interest to us in this study, such shocks may not satisfy condition (i).  Even if long-
run prices are important, short-term fluctuations may not be.  Unfortunately, we have no variables that
permit us to explore the possible significance of such shocks.
To control for individual fixed effects, a dummy variable for each individual in the sample can be
included (thus obtaining estimates of the fi for each of the i individuals) or relation (1) can be differenced
over time (which eliminates all fixed effects in the disturbance term because their differences are zero). 
Either statistical procedure requires multiple observations on the variables that are observed in relation
(1) which, if the unit of observations is individuals, almost always means observations over time.  The
observations on the critical observed variables – Yit and Nit- in relation (1) – moreover must vary over
time for enough individuals in the sample to permit estimation of the impact of the latter on the former. 
We focus on such individual fixed effects estimates below to assess the impact of social networks on
contraceptive use.  Under the assumptions that we have indicated above (with some caveats to which we
turn next), these estimates are of the causal effects of social networks on contraceptive use.
Determinants of changes in the size and composition of social networks: To identify the
causal effect of social networks on contraceptive use in the fixed effect estimation of relation (1) we rely
on variations in the size and composition of a respondent’s social network over time -- in our case by
changes of the variable Nit- across the three survey waves – Kenya 1, Kenya 2 and Kenya 3. Moreover, in
order that the fixed effect estimation of relation (1) reveals the correct social network effect, these
variations in Nit- must not be correlated with the period-specific random disturbance term eit  in relation
(1) that affects contraceptive use by individual i at time t. In particular, variations in the social network
size and composition that are consistent with these conditions include: (a) Some women have more and
some have fewer encounters with others with whom they had not previously discussed family planning
but with whom such discussions occurred by chance and, given our estimates, these new network
partners were contraceptive users or previous network partners who did not use contraception but
subsequently adopted it. (b) The composition of respondent’s social networks at the beginning of the
each inter-survey period, i.e., at Kenya 1 for the period Kenya 1 – Kenya 2 or at Kenya 2 for the period
Kenya 2 – Kenya 3, differ because respondents had differential opportunities or incentives to interact
about family planning with others in the past. This differential “stock” of network partners is likely to be
correlated with the fixed effects  fi in relation (1).  This differential stock of past interactions leads to
different opportunities for new interactions during the period between surveys.  For instance, in Section
3 we present evidence that the increase in network partners (or users among them) is inversely related to
the initial number of network partners, which is plausible because the probability of a chance
conversation in the course of daily life (for example, while fetching water or going to the grain mill)
seems to be greater over an interval the fewer such conversations one has had in the past. Similarly, we5 In the fixed effect estimates, thus, the social network variable effectively is the deviation from the individual
average and is correlated with the individual fixed effect.  But that does not cause biases in the estimates because,
conditional on the functional form in relation (1), the disturbance term in the fixed effect estimate of relation (1) does not
include the individual fixed effect (even though if relation (1) is estimated without control for fixed effects, the
disturbance term does include the unobserved fixed characteristics, which are correlated with the social network variable
and therefore cause the bias on which we are focusing).
6 If we had good measure of such short-run shocks (e.g., short-run deviations from secular trends in prices or in
local supplies of contraceptives) we could include the current value of such shocks in relation (1) to purge the disturbance
term of this effect and/or use lagged values of such shocks that are not correlated with the current values to instrument the
social network variable in relation (1), which would eliminate this potential source of bias in the estimates (e.g.,
Alderman, et al. 2001). Unfortunately, as noted above in our discussion of the instrumental variable alternative, we do
not have observations on such variables.  However, as we also note in that discussion, our prior is that such short-run
shocks are not likely to be major factors in the determination of decisions that have substantial long-run implications and
therefore are likely to be dominated by expectations regarding longer-run prices, interhousehold relations and community
characteristics (the persistent part of which the fixed effect estimates control for perfectly). But this is a maintained
hypothesis that we are not able to test in this study.
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find evidence that the change in the number of network partners is positively related to events that
plausibly increase opportunities to increase interaction (e.g., deaths, funerals, and similar other events
that lead to social gatherings). Because the fixed effect estimation accounts for differences in the stock
of network partners at the beginning of each inter-survey period, the differential changes in the size and
composition of network partners that result from differences in the stock of prior interactions constitute
important sources of variation in network size and composition that allow us to identify the network
effect in the fixed effect estimation of relation (1).
5 The same argument holds if changes in the social
network depend on age or some other fixed individual characteristic such as education (which, however,
in fact does not vary substantially in our sample across the survey period). 
Nevertheless, an important maintained assumption in our analyses is that the representation of
social networks, or the change in social networks between surveys, is independent of  whatever shocks
are in the random part of the disturbance term, eit.
6 A few potential variables that a priori may seem to
violate this assumption, however, turn out to be innocuous. Particularly important in this context are
several life-cycle factors, such as increases in age or duration of marriage, that may lead to increased
incentives for using family planning and interacting with others about family planning. If the relevant
life-cycle variables approximately linearly enter relations (1) and (2), which determine the contraceptive
use and our network representation, then the fixed effect estimation subsume the systematic influence of
these life-cycle changes on both family planning use and the social network representation in the fixed
effect and these changes do not distort the resulting fixed effect estimates of the network influences.
The relevance of including fixed effects in the estimation is revealed in our estimates below by
four aspects of those estimates. First, there is the question of whether – conditional on our assumptions –
the control for fixed effects makes any difference in the estimates.  Second, we also perform Hausman
specification tests that reveal whether the OLS estimates are consistent as compared to the fixed effect
estimates, which are consistent under our model assumptions.  Third, we regress changes in the network
representation Nit- between surveys on the size and composition of the social network at the beginning of11
this period and individual characteristics. If these regressions reveal that the initial stock of social
interaction matters, then it indicates that there are differential opportunities for new social interactions
between surveys depending on how many conversations the respondent already had in the past.
Moreover, if in these regressions the individual characteristics are insignificant, this supports our
hypothesis that changes in the social networks over time are no longer correlated with individual fixed
effects. Fourth, we also present a specification test in which the dependent variable is future network
characteristics and among the right-side variables is current contraceptive use.  Logically, if the causal
influences are from social networks to respondent’s current contraceptive use, the latter variable should
not affect future network characteristics.  But current contraceptive use may be significant in OLS
estimates of this specification  because it proxies for unobserved fixed effects.  If so, it will not be
significant in fixed effects estimates.
Some Further Caveats and Robustness Tests: We also consider some further aspects of the
assumed specification that might be violated and the extent that we can explore the robustness of our
estimates to the violation of these assumptions.
Specification of the dependent variable: We have focused in this section on current use of
contraceptives as reported by women as the dependent variable.  To see how robust are our estimates to
this choice, we also undertake estimates for two other family-planning-related variables as reported by
women (ever-use of contraceptives, want no more children), current contraceptive use as reported by
men and an a variable that captures the extent to which women perceive themselves to be at risk of
AIDS (discussed in Section 3).
A further question concerns measurement error in the dependent variable.  Usually this is ignored
because random measurement error in the dependent variable does not cause biases.  But, based on
comparisons between reported contraceptive use by men versus women, it appears that there may be
some systematic measurement errors that result in men giving higher reports than women (e.g., see the
summary statistics for contraceptive use given in Table 2 below; see also Miller, Zulu and Watkins
forthcoming).  Perhaps, for example, men over-report use because the use of modern contraceptives is
thought to be an indicator of being “modern.”  Or, on the other hand, women may under-report use
because, though they are using modern contraceptives, they do not wish to acknowledge such use given
some question about how socially acceptable is such use.  Such systematic tendencies to over- or under-
report are likely to result in biases in OLS estimates of the impact of social networks on contraceptive
use – probably upward if there is systematic over-reporting and downwards if there is systematic under-
reporting.  But to the extent that for an individual such systematic mis-reporting tendencies are constant
over time, they are controlled in the fixed effect estimates.
Specification of the social network variable: We firstly consider alternative empirical
representations of social networks: the number of network partners who use contraceptives and the
number of network partners not using contraceptives for the dependent variables related to family
planning, and the number of network partners with high perceived AIDS risk and the number of network
partners with low perceived AIDS risk for the dependent variables related to concern about AIDS.12
Secondly, we consider nonlinear effects – in particular, whether the marginal impact of having one
network partner with a given behavior or characteristics (e.g., using contraceptives, having high
perceived AIDS risk) is different from those of having more network partners with such characteristics. 
Thirdly, we consider how our estimates vary when we make opposite extreme assumptions regarding
whether network partners who are not among the four for whom information was collected on
contraceptive use either all are non-users or all are users (see the discussion of the network partner data
in Section 3).
An additional possible problem regarding our representation of network partners is that it may
incorporate random or systematic measurement error.  Random measurement error in a right-side
variable, as is well-known, biases estimated coefficients towards zero and is exacerbated in fixed effects
estimates because such measurement error is larger relative to the deviations from averages on which
fixed effects depend than it is relative to the level of the same variables.  We are not able to control for
random measurement error.  So to the extent that when we ask a respondent how many network partners
does she have and she responds with the true number plus or minus a random term, we underestimate the
effect of networks.  Systematic measurement error would occur if, for example, respondents
systematically under-report their number of network partners because they simply do not recall them all
or they over-report contraceptive use by their network partners because they perceive the research team
to favor family planning and they wish the team to learn that their friends are the sort of people of whom
the team would approve.  Systematic measurement error can bias the estimates in either direction,
depending on its nature.  If respondents systematically understate their number of network partners and
do so more the larger is the true number of their network partners, for example, the result is likely to be
an upward bias in the estimated impact of the number of network partners in OLS estimates. (Intuitively,
the variable that is used in the estimates is smaller than the true number but it represents the effect of the
larger number by attributing greater than true effects to the reported number.)  If respondents
systematically overstate the proportion of their network partners who are using modern contraception, as
seems to be the case in our data (White and Watkins 2000), the result is likely to be a downward bias in
the estimated influence of contraceptive use by network partners.   To the extent that individual
respondents always misreport their number of network partners by the same amount (though this amount
may differ across respondents), our individual fixed effects control perfectly for systematic measurement
error.
Assumption about the distribution of the disturbance term: For the results on which we focus in
the text, as in this section, we use a linear probability model because the role of fixed effects is more
transparent in this linear approximation.  But for dichotomous dependent variables the assumptions of
normality and homoscedasticity of the disturbance term are violated.  We adjust for these violations of
the classical OLS model by using robust standard errors, and with this modification the linear probability
model (with fixed effects) provides consistent estimates of the parameters in relation (1) and their
standard errors. In addition, we present in the appendix fixed effect logit and random effect logit
estimates for comparison.  The former is analogous to the fixed effect regression, while the latter is13
analogous to OLS. Despite the fact that the fixed effect logit estimates are based only on the subset of
women who change their contraceptive behavior over time, which is a disadvantage of this method as
compared to the linear probability model, we note here that these alternative estimates indicate the same
patterns of coefficients as are discussed in the text on the basis of linear probability models.
SECTION 3: STUDY CONTEXT AND DATA
Context: Our empirical analysis uses data that we collected in rural South Nyanza District,
Kenya.  The vast majority of the inhabitants in this area and of the survey respondents are Luo, a group
characterized by exogamous marriage and patrilocal residence.  Men who are de jure residents of a
village are related to each other through a common ancestor. Women, however, must adjust their
networks at marriage when they move to their husband’s community, although they retain links with
their natal families who often reside in other parts of Nyanza Province.
Most residents are engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture, supplemented by small-scale
business, some wage labor, and occasional remittances from urban relatives.  Cash necessary for such
expenses as school fees and clothing is obtained from remittances, wage labor, or, especially for women,
small scale retailing (e.g. buying bananas in a larger market and reselling them locally).  Almost all
respondents live in mud huts with thatched roofs, although some have more costly metal roofs. 
Although most men and women have attended school, few in our sample have studied beyond the
primary grades. Only 13.4 percent of the 926 women whom we interviewed in 1994 had been to school
beyond the primary grades. Those with more education tend to seek work in the cities, particularly
Nairobi and Mombasa; those who do not find jobs in the cities often return to the rural areas and are
engaged in much the same activities as those who have never been to school.  The area has experienced
less socioeconomic development than most other parts of Kenya, in part due to the history of political
opposition in a country where patron-client relations based on ethnicity are important for the distribution
of governmental resources (Weinreb forthcoming).  
The characteristics of Luo social networks are constrained by the setting in which social
interaction takes place: these include poor means of communication with those outside the area,  the
relative lack of economic and social stratification, and normative rules. Yet none of our sample sites are
completely socially isolated.  In the first round of our household survey conducted in 1994/95 (and
described in more detail below), one half of the respondents reported owning a radio and 37 percent of
women and  61 percent of men had spent six months or more after marriage outside their village, usually
in a city.  Women leave the area to visit natal kin living elsewhere in Nyanza or a husband who has
migrated for work.  Funerals, which are frequent due to the high level of AIDS,  bring relatives and
friends to the area for a few days. Nonetheless, because transportation is irregular and expensive and
telephones very few,  frequent social interaction is largely restricted to interactions with other members
of the local community. 
In South Nyanza, both modern methods of family planning and AIDS arrived in the past decade.
The model of a small family achieved through the use of modern methods of family planning was
introduced by the Kenyan government at the urging of the international population movement in the7 Nevertheless, contraceptive prevalence is relatively low compared to some other parts of Kenya. Our
household survey found 12.3 percent of married women were currently using family planning in 1994/95, 17.7 percent in
1996/97 and 17.4 percent in 2000. In addition, 23.0 percent of married women had ever used family planning in 1994/95,
rising to 30.6 percent in 1996/97 and 31.0 percent in 2000.
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1960s and 1970s, but only reached Nyanza through local clinics in the late 1980s and early 1990s
(Watkins and Hodgson 1997). This model was initially perceived as a model of reproduction foreign to
Nyanza because it was associated with whites and with a Kenyan government dominated by members of
other ethnic groups than the Luo.  That foreign model has slowly become domesticated–transformed into
a local Luo model–and contraceptive use has increased and fertility has begun to decline (Watkins
2000).
7 The domestication of the foreign model of reproduction appears to have occurred in part through
local social networks in which Luos evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of  many versus few
children in their current local circumstances, learn from relatives, friends and neighbors about their own
experiences with modern methods of family planning or gossip about the experience of others, and to
assess their network partners support of or opposition to the new reproductive model.   Although many
in our sample voice desires for a smaller number of children than their mothers bore, there is still
considerable ambivalence about the best family size.  Modern methods of family planning are of even
more intense interest, and there is a great deal of discussion, especially in the women’s networks, about
the effects of these methods on women’s bodies (Rutenberg and Watkins 1997).
Much the same process appears to be occurring with AIDS.  Although the first case of AIDS was
officially diagnosed in 1985, as late as 1994 when we conducted exploratory fieldwork we heard little
about it, and when it was mentioned it was as a disease that was relevant to those who lived in towns,
not in  rural villages.  By the time of the second round, AIDS was far more evident (funerals frequently
disrupted the data collection, and deaths to our sample indicated a doubling of death rates for adult men)
and had come to be seen as a local problem.  More than 85 percent of women knew about at least one
recent death for which they suspect AIDS as a potential cause, and more than 30 percent knew about
more than five such cases. AIDS was a frequent topic in social interactions: over three-quarters of the
women had talked with at least one person about AIDS.  Many respondents had come to perceive that
they themselves were at risk of AIDS and were quite worried , and over two-fifths of the women have
talked with at least one network partner who felt herself to be at a moderate or great risk of infection .
Respondents know how AIDS is transmitted, and are primarily concerned about transmission through
sex.  In interaction with their social networks, they are considering strategies for prevention. These
strategies are quite gendered.  Men’s primary strategy concerns extramarital partners: they exchange
information with network partners about the likelihood that a potential network partner is infected, as
well as assessing the social acceptability of condom use with partners perceived not to be safe (Watkins
and Schatz 2001).  Women’s primary concern is that they will be infected by their husbands, who many
suspect may have extramarital sexual relations.  Because condom use to prevent the transmission of
STDs or HIV is considered incompatible with marriage (only 1 percent of the husbands in our survey
said that condoms could be used in marriage or even in a regular relationship), their strategies are15
directed toward persuading their husband to eschew extramarital relations. We have little information on
what husbands and wives say to each other regarding AIDS in South Nyanza, but in semi-structured
interviews with 150 couples in Malawi, a country which in relevant respects is quite similar to Kenya,
we asked how these conversations arose and what was said (this study is described in
http://www.pop.upenn.edu/networks).  There is a clear pattern in the form and content of these
discussions.  Both husband and wife typically described the conversation as introduced by the wife, often
at a peaceful time such as after dinner, and provoked by an event such as a funeral or seeing someone
who had symptoms believed to characterize someone with AIDS (e.g. extreme thinness), hearing
something about AIDS on the radio or at a clinic, or by a conversation with a network partner.  The wife
then focused on the risk that AIDS would leave their children orphans, and they tactfully picture the
solution as joint–“we must take care.” The similarity across couples in the way the wives introduce the
topic of risk and focus on the children suggests that women’s strategies with respect to their husbands
may be a product of discussion with their  their network partners. 
Data: The data were collected by Watkins and colleagues in the Kenyan Diffusion and Ideational
Change Project (KDICP). The KDICP consists of a longitudinal household survey, and a set of
semi-structured interviews and focus groups that were collected during 1994/95, 1996/97 and 2000 in
four rural sublocations (administrative units) in South Nyanza District, Nyanza Province, Kenya. We
describe the data briefly here; more details, the data, and analyses of data quality are available at
www.pop.upenn.edu/networks.  
The first wave of the longitudinal household survey (Kenya 1) was conducted in December 1994
and January 1995, with a sample of  923 women and 744 husbands. The sampling frame was a list of
villages in each of the rural sites.  From this list, enough villages were randomly selected to provide the
desired sample size, consisting of all married women of reproductive age who were present, and their
husbands if they were living at home (there is much male temporary migration for work, and sometimes
wives accompany their husbands to the city). Two years later the second wave (Kenya 2) of the survey
re-interviewed these women and men (and any individuals who were on the first round sample list, had
not been located during that round, but were located in the second round), followed by a third wave in
January and February 2000 (Kenya 3).   Some respondents were present at the time of all three waves, 
some only at one.  Table 1 gives the number of respondents for each of the three data rounds and the
numbers who are in all three rounds. In total, 497 women (324 men) participated in all three survey
waves and reported information on the relevant individual and network characteristics (498 women for
the dependent variable having ever-used contraception), and 545 women (408 men) participated in the
last two rounds of the data collection that contained questions pertaining to AIDS.  A comparison of our
data for South Nyanza in the first two rounds of our survey with the data collected by the 1993 Kenya
Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS 1994) in rural Nyanza Province shows that our data are
representative of the Province.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Table 2 gives summary sample statistics for the variables that we use in our analysis, which we8 Alternative dependent variables might include numbers of extramarital sexual partners and condom use, but
our evidence suggests that the reporting of these variables is quite unreliable. 
9 The initial sample was of married women, but those who were subsequently widowed were retained in the
sample in subsequent waves (divorced women leave their husbands’ home and therefore generally could not be located).  
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now briefly discuss.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Dependent variables (Yit): For family planning we focus on whether a woman is currently (at the
time of the survey) using contraception. The proportion of women currently using contraception
increased from 12 to 17 percent between Kenya 1 and 2, but stayed at 17 percent in Kenya 3. We also
consider for comparative purposes whether the woman has ever used contraception and whether she
wants more children. Whether women have ever used family planning also increased between Kenya 1
and Kenya 2 but then remained at the same level as in Kenya 2 for Kenya 3. The stated desire for no
more children increased slightly throughout the period, though at a lower rate between Kenya 2 and
Kenya 3 than between Kenya 1 and Kenya 2. In addition, we consider whether a man reports current
contraceptive use, which ranges between 20 and 24 percent. As we discussed in Section 2, the higher
level of contraceptive use for males may indicate systematic misreporting of family planning use by
males or by females. 
For the AIDS analyses we use the respondent’s perceived risk of AIDS–often believed to be a
determinant of protective behavior-- as the dependent variable.
8  Data on respondents’ perceived risk
(“worry”) of becoming infected with AIDS were collected as a categorical variable with four options:
none (0), some (1), moderate (3) and great (4); we construct a continuous variable using the values
indicated in parentheses. The summary statistics in Table 2 reflect a gender difference in perceived AIDS
risk, with women reporting more concern than men. Substantial changes in perceptions of risk between
Kenya 2 and Kenya 3 are associated with other changes between the two surveys: for example, those
women who reported that their husband was unfaithful in Kenya 2 but faithful in Kenya 3 perceived their
risk to have declined, whereas those who had come to believe their spouse was having extramarital
sexual relations became more worried (Watkins and Schatz 2001).
The specification of relation (1) is developed in terms explicitly of current use of contraceptives,
but the details in regard to timing carry over directly to wanting more children and the extent to which
respondents perceive themselves to be at risk of AIDS.  The use of this specification for whether she has
ever used contraceptives, however, is more problematic because this dependent variable refers not only
to current but also to past behavior.  Therefore stochastic shocks that affected social networks in the past
also affected the dependent variable, which may result in spurious correlations that could confound the
identification of causal effects.  Despite these caveats we have undertaken estimates with this dependent
variable for comparison.
Individual characteristics  (Xit-): The time-varying variables that are included in our analyses as
controls include the number of births prior to the current period, not being married,
9 having a radio and10 For the network partners’ contraceptive use, we did not ask respondents to distinguish between current use
and ever use at the time of the survey; because contraceptive discontinuation is frequent and because the conversations
occurred in the past,  the respondent may not have known the current contraceptive use status of her network partners. 
For the network partners’ perceived risk (“worry”) of becoming infected with AIDS, on the basis of exploratory analyses,
we dichotomized this into “low” levels of worry (none and some perceived risk) and “high” levels of worry (moderate
and great).
11 Our (and others’) measurement of network characteristics face several limitations. (1) They do not indicate
the relative importance of the various discussions for individual women or provide information on the content of the
conversations. (2) As noted in the text, we follow the practice common in ego-centered network analyses of asking
specific questions about only a subset of network partners for those who report large networks.  Because the choice of
whom the respondent discusses in such cases may not be random, there may be biases embedded in the data, we would
conjecture that the conversations that the respondent recalls are more important.  (Kohler 1998 found bias in the estimates
of density for truncated ego-centered network data).  (3) Our network measurements are based on recall and, as with any
data reconstructed from memory, potential biases exist. Brewer and Webster (2000) and Brewer (2000) found that
respondents tend to forget about a fifth of their personal network partners when asked to list them from memory.  To the
extent that these measurement problems are persistent over time for each respondent, as discussed above, they are likely
to cause biases in OLS estimates, but be controlled in the fixed effects estimates.  Nevertheless, our network
measurements and estimates based on them must be interpreted with some caution. 
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having a metal roof.  As one would expect, these variables tend to increase between 1994/95 and 2000.
Women in 2000 tended to have about 5.3 children, approximately 60 percent had a radio and about 40
percent a metal roof. For our OLS estimates we also include a set of individual characteristics, such as
the level of schooling and age, that drop out in the fixed effects estimates.  (Schooling actually increases
for some respondents over time, but the variation is not sufficient to identify the schooling coefficient in
the fixed effects estimates; therefore in the OLS regressions we use the schooling and age as measured in
Kenya 2).
Social networks:  In the each of the survey waves we asked respondents with whom they had
talked about family planning.  In Kenya 2 and Kenya 3 we also asked respondents with whom they had
talked about AIDS risks. The survey questions in both cases used the word "chat" in order to indicate
that we were interested not in lectures or counseling sessions at the clinics, but rather in informal
interactions.  Both family planning and AIDS are clearly prominent topics in social interactions. In both
of these rounds at least 75 percent of the women reported having discussed family planning or AIDS
with at least one network partner, and these percentages increased to 88 percent by Kenya 3.  On
average, women talked with 2.9 to 4.6 network partners about family planning (3.9 to 4.6 for AIDS).
Detailed questions were asked about the characteristics of a maximum of four of these partners,
including (for the family planning networks) whether the network partner used family planning and (for
the AIDS networks) what is the network partner’s perceived degree of worry about AIDS.
10   This format
produced sets of respondent, or ego-centered, networks with up to four network partners.
11  The average
size of these “censored” networks is between 2.2 to 2.8 for family planning and between 2.4 to 2.9 for
AIDS. About one third of women talked to more than four network partners about family planning, and
more than one half of the women talked to more than four others about AIDS. Due to limited time in the
questionnaire, no detailed information on family planning and AIDS related behaviors and altitudes were
collected for network partners beyond the first four. In our analyses below, we will therefore explore18
alternative assumptions about the distribution of these behaviors/attitudes among these network partners
on whom we do not have detailed information. 
In total, there are 2039 network partners in women’s family planning networks in Kenya 1, 1,867
in Kenya 2, and 2626 in Kenya 3 for whom we have detailed information about contraceptive behavior,
their relation to the respondent, and some socioeconomic characteristics such as education. This
information about the network partners is reported by the respondent, and the variation in the total
number of network partners across survey waves is largely due to the different number of respondents in
the three surveys waves (see Table 1).  In Kenya 2 and Kenya 3 respondents were also asked the same
questions about their informal conversations about AIDS (they were not asked in Kenya 1 because, as
noted earlier, at the time of our exploratory fieldwork in early 1994 AIDS was not an open topic of
discussion).  There were a total of 1730 network partners in women’s AIDS network in Kenya 2 and
2689 in Kenya 3.
A clear pattern in Table 2 is the marked trend towards larger family planning and AIDS networks.
For both males and females, the fraction of respondents who had conversations about AIDS and family
planning has been increasing over time. For instance, while 25 percent of women in Kenya 1 reported no
communications about family planning, this fraction declined to 12 percent in Kenya 3. The reasons for
this increase are twofold. First, if respondents do not forget their past conversations, the number of
network partners can not decrease over time and the reported increase could be only due to the fact of
accumulating more conversations over time without indicating an increased frequency of such
conversations. We believe, however, that the increase is social network size and the number of family
planning users in these networks is also due to more frequent interactions about family planning and
AIDS. Although the questions about conversations about family planning or AIDS in the questionnaire
did not specify a time frame for these conversations, it seems as if respondents primarily include
relatively recent interactions among the first four network partners about whom detailed information was
collected. For instance, the female respondents who participated in all three waves of the survey reported
a total of 1,636 network partners with detailed information in Kenya 3, and in 89 percent (or 1,455
cases) the most recent communication with the respective network partner about family planning has
been in the period since the earlier survey, Kenya 2. In Kenya 2, however, the same respondents already
reported a total of 1,422 network partners in their family planning networks. Hence, a net increase of 181
in the number of network partners with detailed information between Kenya 2 and Kenya 3 corresponds
to at least 1,422 conversations about family planning during this period (we only know the lower bound
since their could have been multiple conversations with the same network partner, and also some
respondents’ networks have been censored; Table 2 shows that this extent of censoring is increasing over
time). We cannot disentangle for our data to which extent the recent conversations in Kenya 3, i.e., the
interactions that have occurred during the period since Kenya 2, are with network partners who were
already part of the network in Kenya 2. However, the above data about the most recent conversations
clearly indicate that respondents referred to relatively recent conversations about family planning.
Changes in the size and composition of the family network therefore seem to reflect the extent of recent19
conversations about family planning, and we therefore believe that the information about network
partners in Table 2 indicates an increase in the frequency of interactions about family planning and not
merely the accumulation of more network partners due to a longer time span in which interactions may
have occurred. (Similar analyses for the other periods and networks show results that are comparable to
the above family planning example.) The increase in the number of contraceptive users in the family
planning networks can therefore occur because a network partner, who was already mentioned at an
earlier wave, adopts family planning over time or because women are more likely to encounter family
planning users instead of non-users in their most recent conversations.
Because the identification of the network effect in the fixed effect regression (1) is based on
within-individual variations in the size and composition of the family planning or AIDS network over
time, we report in Table 3 summary statistics for the within-individual variation in the primary network
representations that are used in the subsequent estimations. For family planning, these deviations from
the within-individual average reflect the change towards an increased level of current use across
individuals, and they reflect the increased social interaction with both users and non-users. Moreover,
the standard deviation of these individual-level deviations from the average is relatively constant in each
variable across all waves, indicating that in all periods the contraceptive use and our primary network
characteristics varied to an approximately equal extent from their individual averages. For AIDS, the
summary statistics in Table 3 indicate a very weak trend towards a reduced perception of AIDS risk for
respondents, and tendency towards an increased number of network partners who perceive respectively a
moderate/high or low/no AIDS risk.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In Table 4 we further report regressions of the change in the number of family planning users and
non-users between surveys in the respondent’s family planning network on the initial number of users
and non-users in the network. The pattern emerging from these regressions is that a smaller initial
number of users (non-users) is strongly associated with larger changes in the number of users (or non-
users) inter-survey period.  Moreover, having an initial larger number of non-users in the network is also
associated with larger increases in the number of users. This suggests that some respondents “replace”
their non-users with users, or alternatively, that the respective network partners adopt contraceptives
over time. Moreover, funerals seem to be an important catalyst of social interactions about family
planning, and respondents in villages with more frequent funerals, many of which are due to AIDS
related deaths, tend to have more users and non-users of family planning in their networks. Time-varying
individual characteristics, such as having a metal roof or radio (both signs of relative wealth), or the
number of children ever born, do not significantly predict changes in the social networks. In addition,
there is some indication that the change in the number of family planning users increases and the change
in non-users decreases with age, which may reflect a life-cycle pattern and or may be related to the fact
that older women interact more frequently with women who are more likely to be users due to their
higher age or fertility. Finally, women with secondary education also tend to have larger changes in the
number of users over time.12 This test does not, of course, control for individual fixed effects and cannot be conducted with individual
fixed effects because such estimates can not be made for those absent for a survey round. The maintained assumption,
therefore, is that the bias due to unobserved variables is identical for all members of the sample, whether or not they were
present at all three survey rounds.  
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These changes in the number of users and non-users in respondents networks between survey
periods is consistent with our theoretical discussion in Section 2 about the determinants of network
change. Moreover, the dependence of the changes in the number of users or non-users in respondent’s
networks on the initial size and composition of the network and fixed individual characteristics such as
age and higher education is likely to be due to individual fixed effects  fi. These effects, however, are
removed from relation (1) in our fixed effect estimations.
Analysis of sample attrition: As noted, we conduct our analysis for a subsample of respondents for
whom we have data on all three rounds (see Table 1). In particular, the analyses for family planning are
based on 55 percent of the sample population contacted in Kenya 1, and the analyses for AIDS are based
on 75 percent of the respondents who participated in Kenya 2 when AIDS related questions were
introduced in the questionnaire. Many analysts have the intuition that attrition is likely to be selective on
characteristics such as schooling and thus that high attrition is likely to bias estimates made from
longitudinal data.  Most studies of attrition that we have found are for large longitudinal samples in
developed countries, several of which appeared  in a special issue of The Journal of Human Resources
(Spring 1998) on “Attrition in Longitudinal Surveys.” The striking result of these studies is that the
biases in estimated socioeconomic relations due to attrition are small—despite attrition rates as high as
50 percent and with significant differences between  the means of a number of outcome and standard
control variables for those lost to follow-up and those who were re-interviewed. 
We undertake similar analyses of attrition for our sample.  We find that there are a fair amount of
differences between our sample respondents for this study and those lost to the sample for at least one
but not all three rounds: the latter tend to have higher education and be younger, for example, which a
priori is plausible if women with such characteristics are likely to be more geographically mobile
(Appendix Table A1).  Some of the differences in the means are significant.  But, as noted in the
literature for developed countries to which reference is made above, differences in means of observed
characteristics of those not continuously in the sample versus respondents for all sample rounds does not
necessarily mean that there are differences in the coefficient estimates of the relations of interest.  To
explore this possibility we conduct the Becketti, Gould, Lillard, and Welch (1988) (BGLW) test in
which we estimate for each round of data the OLS linear probability model for contraceptive use, but we
let each of the coefficient estimates possibly differ between attritors and the respondents for whom we
have data in all three rounds (Appendix Table A2).
12  Tests of joint significance for the possibility that
the coefficient estimates differ between attritors and respondents indicate no significant differences (the
tests are not significant at a 25 percent or higher level).  It therefore appears in our data, as in the
corresponding analyses for developed country data (e.g., Panel Study on Income Dynamics), that21
attrition is selective in the sense that mean characteristics of those who were not interviewed in all three
rounds sometimes differ from the respondents who are included in all three rounds.  However, such
differences do not distort significantly the coefficient estimates in these multivariate relations, and the
estimated coefficients tend to be robust despite substantial attrition in our longitudinal survey.
SECTION 4: ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL NETWORKS ON FERTILITY-
RELATED BEHAVIORS AND ATTITUDES
Table 5 gives a set of estimates for the linear probability model in relation (1) for women
reporting currently using contraceptives. The number of respondents used for each estimate is 497.  Each
respondent contributes three observations: one in which the current period is for Kenya 3, and two
additional observations in which the current period is for Kenya 1 and Kenya 2.  There are four pairs of
estimates that differ only in their representations of social networks: 
(1) number of network partners using contraceptives, 
(2) number of network partners using contraceptives and number of network partners not using
contraceptives, 
(3) whether at least one network partner uses contraceptives and number above one of network
partners using contraceptives, and
(4) whether at least one network partner uses contraceptives, number above one of network
partners using contraceptives, whether at least one network partner does not use contraceptives
and number above one of network partners who do not use contraceptives.
Each pair includes our a priori preferred individual fixed effects estimates for relation (1) and, for
comparison, OLS estimates.  For each estimate the right-side variables include a control for the survey
round. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses beneath the point estimates.  These account for
potential heteroskedasticity and, for the OLS estimates, the correlation in the disturbances for the same
individual across time. The corresponding fixed effect (and random effect) logit estimates are presented
in Appendix Table A3. The interpretations of these logit estimates agree with those of the linear
probability model, on which we focus in the text.
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The individual fixed effects estimates indicate that the probability of women currently using
contraceptives increases significantly by a little more than 0.038 for every network partner on the
average who is a user.  However this average effect primarily is the effect of having at least one
contraceptive user among the network partners.  Having one contraceptive user among the network
partners increases the probability of the female respondent being a current user significantly by about
0.054.  The point estimate indicates that having additional network partners who are users beyond the
first one increases the probability of use by about 0.032 for each additional network partner.  Moreover,
the respondent’s contraceptive use is exclusively related to network partners who are themselves users of
contraception. In none of the fixed effect estimates in Table 5 does the number of non-users of family
planning, or the presence of at least one such non-user, have a significant or substantial effect.
The estimated fixed effect coefficients in Table 5 for the influence of family planning users in the22
social network on the respondent’s own contraceptive use prima facie may seem small -- significantly
different from zero but not very substantial.  For instance, the increase in the probability of using
contraceptives equals 0.05 if one has a network partner who uses contraceptives, controlling for all fixed
characteristics that might affect both social networks and contraceptive use. Does this constitute a small
or a large effect?  Our answer to this question is that, in comparison with the mean levels of
contraceptive use that are summarized in Table 2, this is a substantial effect, increasing the probability of
use by roughly one third at the sample means.
Our preferred estimates control, as noted, for all unobserved fixed characteristics that might affect
both current contraceptive use and social networks.   For reasons that we discuss in Section 2 our prior is
that the fixed effects estimates are preferred over the OLS estimates due to unobserved fixed factors that
would seem to affect both. In addition, Hausman specification tests for all models in Table 5 reject the
null hypothesis that the OLS models are appropriate and these tests therefore strongly suggest the
necessity to account for unobserved individual characteristics through fixed effects (or alternative
methods).
Do our controls make any substantive difference?  The answer to this question is definitely yes. 
The first set of estimates, for example, indicates that the OLS estimates of the average effect of
contraceptive users in social networks on women’s current contraceptive use is biased upward by 180
percent.  The third and fourth sets of estimates indicate that the OLS estimates understate substantially
the effect of having at least one contraceptive user in one’s social relative network relative to that of
having subsequent network partners who are users.  Furthermore, the fourth set of estimates indicates
that OLS estimates distort the impact of having non-users in the network, and make it appear that effect
is weakly significant even though it is not in fixed effects estimates. The finding that OLS overestimates
the influence of social networks on contraceptive use also indicates that the unobserved individual and
community factors, represented by the term fi in relation (1), are positively correlated with the respective
representation of the social network, Nit-. In the first and second set of estimates in Table 5, for instance,
the direction of change between the fixed effect and OLS estimates suggests that women with
unobserved characteristics in fi, that increase her probability of contraceptive use, also tend to have more
social network partners who are users of family planning and fewer who are non-users (although the
latter effect is weak).
In summary, the estimates in Table 5 suggest that (i) having a contraceptive user in a woman’s
social network prior to the time of the survey has a significant and substantial effect on the probability
that she currently uses contraceptives even with control for such unobserved factors that may affect both
the propensities to use contraceptives and social networks,  and (ii) OLS estimates based on the
assumption that social networks are random result in substantial biases in the estimated impact of prior
social networks on women’s current contraceptive use.
The estimates in Table 5 include exploration of some aspects of the representation of social
networks.  We also have explored some other aspects of the specification, as noted in Section 2. For
example, we investigate what happens if all of the network partners who are mentioned beyond the first23
four (the only ones for whom contraceptive use was asked) are assumed to be non-users or, alternatively,
users.  As noted in Section 3, between 23 and 37 percent of the respondents mentioned more than four
network partners but, due to the need to keep the interview of manageable length, information was asked
(including contraceptive use) only for the first four network partners mentioned.  
Table 6 presents the fixed effects estimates with the second representation of social networks in
Table 5 for (i) the extreme assumption that all network partners beyond the first four are not users, (ii)
the opposite extreme assumption that all network partners beyond the first four are contraceptive users,
and (iii) an intermediate assumption that all network partners beyond the first four are users or non-users
in the same proportion as the first four network partners.  Our intuition is that the first assumption is
likely to be much closer to reality than the second or third assumption given (a) the usage rates reported
by the respondents themselves in the sample and (b) a probable tendency to mention first those network
partners who are users (even though there was no instruction to do so) because conversations with such
network partners may have seemed more relevant in a context where outsiders have come to ask
questions (see Miller, Watkins and Zulu, forthcoming).  The estimates in Table 6, particularly for the
first assumption, are basically consistent with those in Table 5.  The first one yields an identical
significant coefficient estimate for the number of users in the network as in the corresponding model in
Table 5.  The coefficient estimate on the number of nonusers remains insignificant but becomes much
smaller, as would be expected given the increase in the mean of this variable with this adjustment.  The
last assumption, a proportional distribution of network partners beyond the fourth, is also consistent with
the estimates in Table 5, although there is a substantial reduction in the coefficient (from .038 to .013)
due to the increase in the mean and variation of the number family planning users in the network under
this assumption; nevertheless, the effect of interacting with family planning users remains significant
even in this specification. The second assumption, on the other hand, yields a much smaller and less
significant (nonzero only at the 14 percent level) coefficient estimate for the number of network partners
who are users, apparently because the mean number of users under this extreme assumption is much
higher (so the coefficient estimate declines to obtain the same effect) and because the highly unlikely
assumption that all network partners above four are users introduces a lot of noise into this variable
(which, to the extent that it is random, biases the coefficient estimate towards zero and lessens the
precision).
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Another aspect of the specification that we have explored is whether the results are robust if we
use alternative dependent variables.  Table 7 presents estimates parallel to those in Table 5, but with
having ever-used contraceptives as the dependent variable instead of currently using contraceptives.  As
we discuss in Sections 2 and 3, on a priori grounds we prefer the dependent variable “currently using
contraceptives” because the stochastic term in relation (1) for this variable is more likely to be
independent of the prior social network, as is required for the identification of the causal effect of prior
social networks on contraceptive use.  But the estimates in Table 7 suggest that very similar results to
those in Table 5 are obtained if the dependent variable is ever having used contraceptives. The estimated24
network effect is somewhat larger than in the estimates for current use, and at least one user in the
network is not more important than the remaining number of users. However, similar to the earlier
results, OLS substantially overestimates and in part mis-represents the effects of social networks on
women’s contraceptive use.  The analogous results for the dependent variable indicating that a woman
wants no more children, which are not presented here, also provide consistent estimates to those reported
in Table 5 and 6, although the estimates for wanting no more children are more imprecise than those for
contraceptive use.
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A different sort of specification test that we mention in Section 2 is to explore whether past
contraceptive use predicts current social networks and whether such predictions, if significant, remain
significant with control for individual fixed effects.  The first estimates in Table 8  is the OLS estimate
in which the current number of social network partners using contraceptives is the dependent variable.
Among the right-side variables is contraceptive use at the previous survey round (referred to as time t -
1), as well as a number of controls parallel to those included in Table 5 but for both the current (referred
to as time t) and the past (referred to as time t - 1) period.  The estimates suggest that a respondent’s past
contraceptive use is a powerful predictor of the current number of her network partners who use
contraception, with a coefficient estimate indicating that past users have 0.63 more current network
partners who are users than do past nonusers (an estimate that has a t ratio of 4.43).  Similarly, past
contraceptive use is a powerful predictor of the current size of the family planning network.  Of course,
this predictive power may only reflect preferences for homophilous network partners – women who are
“like me” are more likely to be users if the respondent is a user (and vice versa) – or other unobserved
factors.  These possibilities are controlled in the second estimates in Table 8 with individual fixed
effects.  Once fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics are introduced in the estimation, the
coefficient estimate for past contraceptive use practically disappears. The value becomes much smaller
in magnitude (actually slightly negative) and not significantly different from zero even at the 50 percent
level.  This comparison suggests that, consistent with our interpretation of Table 5, unobserved factors
such as preferences for homophily are important in understanding the contraceptive use-social network
nexus and estimates that are made without controlling for them may be very misleading for identifying
causal effects, even if the associations in such estimates appear strong.
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All of the estimates that we have discussed to this point are for family-planning related variables
for females.   A related question is whether there are parallel results for males.  The demographic
literature on social networks has tended to focus on females, which may reflect a perception that females
are more engaged in such networks or more central in contraceptive choices.  But certainly casual
observations in the sample villages suggest that males spend a lot of time in informal social interactions,
and they report “chatting” about family planning about as much as do females.  Table 9 presents
estimates for males parallel to those in Table 5 for females (The corresponding random and fixed effect
logit models are presented in Appendix Table A4 and yield very similar results).  Comparisons between13 The relatively small change in the estimates for males suggests that the biases towards zero due to random
measurement error that often have been emphasized in concerns about fixed effects estimates (e.g., Griliches 1979,
Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994) probably are not all that large.  This also gives us more confidence that the differences
between the OLS and the fixed effects estimates for females are substantially due to control for important unobserved
fixed effects and not just an artifact of  random measurement error because we have no reason to expect that random
measurement error would be so much larger for females than for males as would be required were that the explanation for
the difference between the OLS and fixed effects estimates in Table 5.  (Systematic measurement error may differ by
gender but, as noted in Section 2, any individual systematic over- or under-reporting is effectively part of what is
controlled in the fixed effects estimates.)
14 The AIDS network has substantially more men (26 percent of women’s  AIDS network partners are men,
compared to 4 percent men in the family planning network); they are also more likely to be better educated than the
respondent’s family planning network, less likely to have a similar level of education as the respondent (more better
educated and more less well educated), more likely to be in frequent contact (daily or weekly) with the respondent, and
more likely to be friends (rather than confidantes or acquaintances).  
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these two sets of estimates for males indicate: (1) Social networks have significant positive impact on
contraceptive use for males as for females,  even when unobserved individual fixed factors are
controlled.  Despite the frequent protestations by male respondents that family planning was a “woman’s
matter” and the local perception that it is women who gossip, not men, the estimates indicate much
larger effects for males than for females.  (2) The fixed effect estimates differ in some other respects
besides the magnitude between males and females. In particular, those for males indicate greater (and
significant) effects of having additional network partners who are users beyond the first one.  (3) The
OLS estimates for males appear to be less biased – sometimes substantially less – than are those for
females.
13  
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Finally we note that in estimates that are not presented for brevity, for males, as for females, the
social network effects carry over to other dependent variables, such as having ever used contraceptives
and wanting no more children (in fact in the latter with stronger evidence of significant coefficient
estimates than for females).
SECTION 5: ESTIMATES FOR CONCERN ABOUT AIDS RISKS
In our discussion of the context in South Nyanza in Section 3 we mentioned substantial informal
discussion of AIDS, provoked by worries about the risk of contracting AIDS.  Given the frequency of
funerals, it is not surprising that only a minority of the respondents reported that they were “not at all”
worried about AIDS, and that the topic was discussed intensively with network partners and with
spouses.  Conversations about AIDS with network partners occurred in much the same circumstances as
those about family planning, for example while women are going about their daily activities or visiting
with each other in their homes.  Although AIDS is perceived to be very different from family
planning–AIDS is associated with promiscuity, whereas contraception is considered a family matter--the
characteristics of the network partners in the AIDS conversational networks are very similar to those in
the family planning conversational networks (Watkins and Warriner 2000).
14  
The data that we collected on concerns about AIDS and AIDS social networks in Kenya 2 and
Kenya 3 permit us to investigate whether social networks have an impact on being worried about AIDS. 15 As in Section 4 for the male estimates, these results reinforce our interpretation that random measurement
error in measuring network characteristics is not a major part of the difference between our OLS and fixed effects
estimates.  The effect of random measurement error is to bias the fixed effects results towards zero, so it can not
dominate if  the fixed effects estimates are larger in absolute magnitude than the OLS estimates.
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The role of social networks in affecting concerns about and behaviors related to AIDS, of course, is of
substantial interest in itself.  In addition this exploration permits comparisons with the investigation in
Section 4 above about the impact of social networks on family planning.  The dependent variable that we
use in this section is the respondent’s perceived risk of becoming infected with AIDS. Similar to our
earlier analyses, we represent social networks by the extent to which the respondent’s network partners
are reported to be worried about AIDS (although in what follows we will refer to the network partners
perceptions of risk, this perception is reported by the respondent).  In particular, we include the number
of network partners who perceive either no or only a small risk of AIDS infection, and we include the
number of network partners who perceive moderate or great risks of getting AIDS. The analyses also
contain all of the other right-side controls that we include for the analysis in Section 4.  
Table 10 presents estimates for women’s perceived AIDS risk of getting AIDS. These estimates
are parallel to the second and fourth groups of estimates in Table 5 for current contraceptive use, with
the exception that the dependent variable is only available at two instead of three survey waves. The
analyses are therefore based on all women who participated in both Kenya 2 and 3.  The results in Table
10 suggest that, parallel to the estimates for contraceptive use in Section 4, (1) there are substantial and
significant social network effects on the perception of AIDS risk, (2) OLS estimates lead to biased
estimates of these networks effects, and (3) the basic network effects depend on having at least one
person with high perceived AIDS risk.  
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But there are also some noteworthy differences between these estimates and the ones in Table 5
for current contraceptive use.  First, there is evidence of significant impact in the fixed effects estimates
of both types of network partners, not only those with high perceived risks.  These effects are smaller in
absolute magnitude for those partners with low perceived risks than the effects of those with high
perceived risks, particularly for the dependent variable being one’s own perceived AIDS risk.  In other
words, the effects are not symmetrical: conversations with network partners who are worried heighten
the respondent’s perception that she is at risk of AIDS, whereas conversations with network partners
who are not worried have weaker effects in reducing her concern.  Second, for the own perceived AIDS
risk dependent variable, the OLS biases tend to be downward rather than upward.  For the second set of
estimates, for example, the OLS estimates of the absolute magnitude of having at least one network
partner with high (low) risks are 20-33 percent below the fixed effects estimates.
15  This suggests that the
correlation of unobserved individual characteristics that affect positively one’s own perceived AIDS risk
with the number of network partners with either high or low risk is negative.  This is consistent with a
situation in which women who currently are relatively concerned talk a lot with others, perhaps hoping
to learn something that would help them formulate strategies of protection that would keep risks16 While these are generalizations, there are some exceptions, such as the impact of additional network partners
using contraceptives beyond one on male contraceptive use.
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relatively low – although these conversations have the effect of increasing their anxiety. Women who are
relatively unconcerned about their risks despite perceiving them to be high, however, may not try to
learn as much from network partners as do those who are less fatalistic because there is less expected
payoff to doing so.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Casual observations suggest that individuals do not make decisions in social isolation, but in
interaction with each other. Social scientists have recently begun to modify accounts of social change
that focus on individual actors by taking communities, neighborhoods and networks into account. Yet
the literature does not permit confident inferences regarding the causal effects of social networks
because unobserved factors that might directly affect attitudes and behavior might also directly affect the
units of social interaction.   For example,  women with preferences for network partners like themselves
may interact with similar women, and all of those in a network may be exposed to the same market and
community constraints and possibilities.  Thus, what has been interpreted as the causal effects of social
networks may simply be associations because the causal direction is unclear.  
The availability of an unusual longitudinal data and uses of statistical methods that control for
unobserved factors provide an unusual opportunity to extend the individualistic rational actor and
neoclassical models to incorporate social interaction, and to estimate the causal effects of social
networks on attitudes and behavior.  Our major findings are: 
First, and foremost, our analysis shows that social networks have significant and substantial
effects even when we control for unobserved factors that also may determine the nature of the social
networks. In particular, this study provides what we believe are currently the best available estimates
about the effects of social networks on family planning and AIDS- related behaviors and attitudes. In
addition, a corollary of our results is that network analyses predicated on the assumption that social
networks are random are likely to be misleading. 
Second, the effects of social networks that we found contribute to a better understanding of social
change.  These effects are generally nonlinear and asymmetric.  They are particularly large for having at
least one network partner who is perceived to be using contraceptives or with high perceived AIDS risk.  
The inclusion of additional networks partners with the same characteristic or with the opposite
characteristic generally has much smaller or insignificant effects.
16  The combination of this form of
nonlinearity and asymmetry is consistent with the usual stereotypic diffusion models (e.g., Rogers 1995). 
If there are just a few who initially adopt an innovation, they have relatively large influence through
networks because they interact with relatively large numbers of individuals who have not yet adopted; in
such cases they provide these individuals with at least one adopter, the influence of which is relatively
large.  Thus, adoption initially accelerates. As there are more innovators,  however, the marginal
influence of yet another adopter eventually starts to decline.  Interaction processes therefore suggest that28
social networks are likely to have large effects on attitudes and behavior as long as an innovation is not
widely disseminated.  As innovative behavior increases, the marginal effect of interactions is likely to be
much smaller than in the early phase of the diffusion process. 
Third, the effects of networks are not confined to the use of family planning by women, the focus
of much of the literature on networks in demography, but appear to be more general, influencing
responses to HIV/AIDS, and influencing men as well as women.  
Fourth, estimates of the effects of social networks based on the assumption that they are
determined randomly, as in previous studies, may lead to substantial misunderstanding regarding the
impact of social networks on individual behaviors.  This is the case because such estimates ignore that
there may be important factors such as homophily that determine social networks.  For instance, women
who are more likely to want to restrict their childbearing and thus use contraceptives are more likely to
have in their social networks women who also use contraceptives. 
Although the data are particular to rural Kenya and our examples are of specific interest to
demographers interested in diffusion through social interaction,  we believe the approach exemplified
here is of wider use for those interested in social change. In particular, our results support the
expectations in the literature on threshold models that a small amount of social interaction can facilitate
and promote substantial social change.  Specifically, the use of family planning has already increased
rapidly worldwide and fertility has begun to decline almost everywhere in developing countries
(Bongaarts and Watkins 1996). Our results suggest that the rabidity of these changes is related to only
small amounts of interaction. Interaction with at least one network partner is critical, with additional
network partners being much less important.  These results also offer grounds for some cautious
optimism to those concerned with the widespread pandemic of AIDS because social interaction may
stimulate a potential for rapid change in relevant attitudes and preventive behavior. 29
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Observational Data," Annual Review of Sociology 25:659-707.Table 1: Number of respondents in each of the rounds of the KDICP data
number of number of number of number of





Kenya 1 (1994/95) 923 909 744 572
Kenya 2 (1996/97) 740 724 565 549
Kenya 3 (2000) 925 884 699 602
Participating in Kenya 1  497 (498)
b 324
  through Kenya 3
Participating in Kenya 1 and 2 545 408
Notes: (a) women/men with non-missing information on the variables included in the 
subsequent regressions (e.g., contraceptive use, education, marital status, etc.)
(b) For ever used contraception, there are 498 instead of 497 women with non-
missing informationTable 2: Summary Statistics
Females Males
Kenya 1 Kenya 2 Kenya 3 Kenya 1 Kenya 2 Kenya 3
N 909 724 884 572 549 602
Individual Characteristics at t-
Age 28.7 32.75 error 39.19 43.76 error 
(7.95) (8.37) in var! (11.92) (13.07) in var!
Not Married 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.04
Children ever born 4.47 5.44 5.34 6.11 7.53 7.46
(3.08) (3.08) (3.18) (5.37) (6.68) (5.37)
Has radio 0.51 0.60 0.63 0.50 0.65 0.73
Has metal roof 0.20 0.25 0.41 0.19 0.27 0.41
Has at least primary schooling 0.80 0.79 0.82 0.90 0.90 0.92
Has secondary or higher schooling 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.32 0.28 0.33
Family planning variables, respondent
Proportion currently using family planning 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.20
Proportion ever using family planning 0.23 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.28
Proportion wanting no more chidren 0.32 0.39 0.41 0.22 0.28 0.32
Family planning (fp) network
Proportion with at least one nwp in fp network 0.75 0.81 0.88 0.71 0.75 0.81
Uncensored size of family planning network 2.88 3.90 4.61 3.42 3.93 5.10
(2.68) (3.64) (4.08) (3.67) (4.10) (4.89)
Censored size of family planning network 2.23 2.54 2.83 2.25 2.39 2.77
(1.61) (1.52) (1.41) (1.68) (1.64) (1.57)
Proportion with more than 4 network partners 0.23 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.32 0.41
Prop. with at least one nwp fp user in network 0.48 0.63 0.61 0.41 0.49 0.47
Number of fp users in network (censored) 1.03 1.42 1.24 0.95 1.16 1.05
(1.31) (1.40) (1.30) (1.36) (1.42) (1.37)
Perceived AIDS risk, respondent
Proportion perceiving no risk -- 0.25 0.20 -- 0.28 0.21
Proportion perceiving small risk -- 0.35 0.44 -- 0.38 0.53
Proportion perceiving moderate risk -- 0.26 0.27 -- 0.23 0.22
Proportion perceiving great risk -- 0.14 0.09 -- 0.11 0.04
AIDS network
Prop. with at least one nwp in AIDS network -- 0.76 0.88 -- 0.83 0.91
Uncensored size of AIDS network -- 3.90 4.62 -- 3.96 5.10
(3.62) (4.08) (4.08) (4.90)
Censored size of AIDS network -- 2.38 2.91 -- 2.70 3.26
(1.61) (1.42) (1.52) (1.27)
Proportion with more than 4 network partners -- 0.51 0.53 -- 0.43 0.47
Proportion with at least one nwp who perceives -- 0.42 0.53 -- 0.48 0.48
   moderate or great AIDS risk
Number of nwp who perceive moderate or -- 0.91 1.06 -- 1.09 0.93
   great AIDS risk (1.28) (1.24) (1.37) (1.19)
Proportion with at least one nwp who perceives -- 0.47 0.70 -- 0.55 0.77
   no or small Aids risk
Number of nwp who perceive no or -- 0.98 1.61 -- 1.19 2.07
   small AIDS risk (1.27) (1.40) (1.36) (1.47)
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesesTable 3: Summary statistics for deviations of family planning use, family planning network characteristics, AIDS perception
and AIDS network characteristics from the within-individual average in the three survey waves
Only respondents who participated in Kenya 1 -- Kenya 3 (family planning) or Kenya 2 -- Kenya 3 (AIDS)
Females Males
Kenya 1 Kenya 2 Kenya 3 Kenya 1 Kenya 2 Kenya 3
N 497 497 497 324 324 324
Currently using family planning -0.039 0.009 0.030 -0.031 0.043 -0.012
(0.261) (0.254) (0.273) (0.284) (0.314) (0.303)
Family planning (fp) network
Number of fp users in network (censored) -0.256 0.173 0.082 -0.154 0.130 0.025
(0.971) (0.937) (0.964) (0.995) (0.976) (1.028)
Number of non-fp users in network  -0.143 -0.197 0.340 -0.120 -0.179 0.299
   (censored) (1.071) (1.008) (1.016) (1.187) (1.118) (1.172)
N -- 545 545 -- -- --
Perceived AIDS risk, respondent
a -- 0.005 -0.005 -- -- --
   (scaled 1 through 4) (0.585) (0.585)
Aids network
Number of nwp who perceive moderate or -- -0.095 0.095 -- -- --
   great AIDS risk (0.839) (0.839)
Number of nwp who perceive no or -- -0.300 0.300 -- -- --
   small AIDS risk (0.903) (0.903)
Notes: (a) because there are only two survey waves with AIDS information, the summary for the deviations from the
within-individual mean are equal in Kenya 2 and Kenya 3 are equal (with the exception of sign differences)Table 4: Females -- regression of changes in the number of family planning users and non-users in 
network between survey waves on the initial number of users and non-users and personal 
characteristics (Changes in the number of users are measured between Kenya 1 and Kenya 2, 
and between Kenya 2 and Kenya 3; the initial network composition is measured respectively at 
Kenya 1 and Kenya 2)
number of number of
users non-users
# of nwp using family planning (fp), time t- -0.722 0.015
(0.035)** (0.033)
# of nwp not using family planning (fp), time t- 0.102 -0.899
(0.034)** (0.033)**
village average number of funerals attended
a 0.134 -0.095
(0.034)** (0.035)**
dummy for not married, time t 0.372 -0.226
(0.251) (0.225)
children ever born, time t -0.008 0.008
(0.020) (0.020)
Respondent has radio, time t 0.110 0.095
(0.085) (0.089)
Respondent has metal roof, time t 0.122 -0.009
(0.104) (0.104)
Respondent has at least primary education 0.192 0.041
(0.118) (0.112)




(age/10) squared 0.00002 0.000
-0.0006 (0.000)
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 2 -0.534 2.465
(0.267)* (0.269)**
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 3 -0.273 1.886
(0.253) (0.260)**
Notes: 
p-values: + < .1; * < .05; ** < .01
Robust standard errors are used to account for potential heteroscedasticity; these robust
standard errors additionally account for the correlation of residuals for the same 
individual across time periods
a) the village average number of funerals attended in the last month prior to the survey; this
question is only available for Kenya 1 and Kenya 3, and these two measurements were 
used to predict respectively the change in networks between Kenya 1 and 2, and 
Kenya 2 and 3.Table 5: Females -- linear probability models for currently using family planning with different specifications of network partners’ family
planning use. Respondent’s contraceptive use is measured at K1, K2 and K3. 
Method Fixed OLS Fixed OLS Fixed OLS Fixed OLS
Effects Effects Effects Effects
# of nwp using family planning (fp), time t- 0.0385 0.0703 0.0328 0.0673
(0.0091)** (0.0085)** (0.0098)** (0.0086)**
# of nwp not using family planning (fp), time t- -0.0120 -0.0076
(0.0079) (0.0063)
at least one fp user in network 0.0542 0.0279 0.0508 0.0151
(0.0251)* (0.0201) (0.0276)+ (0.0225)
# number of remaining fp users in network 0.0324 0.0871 0.0241 0.0876
(0.0146)* (0.0137)** (0.0157) (0.0146)**
at least one non-user in network -0.0028 0.0334
(0.0290) (0.0269)
# number of remaining non-users in network -0.0177 -0.0201
(0.0136) (0.0114)+
dummy for not married, time t -0.0586 -0.0699 -0.0592 -0.0703 -0.0567 -0.0716 -0.0569 -0.0740
(0.0457) (0.0343)* (0.0458) (0.0343)* (0.0459) (0.0343)* (0.0459) (0.0343)*
children ever born, time t 0.0099 0.0043 0.0109 0.0046 0.0095 0.0046 0.0106 0.0047
(0.0107) (0.0048) (0.0107) (0.0048) (0.0107) (0.0048) (0.0107) (0.0048)
Respondent has radio, time t 0.0363 0.0291 0.0371 0.0301 0.0355 0.0310 0.0362 0.0316
(0.0255) (0.0210) (0.0255) (0.0211) (0.0255) (0.0209) (0.0255) (0.0210)
Respondent has metal roof, time t -0.0752 0.0245 -0.0759 0.0252 -0.0766 0.0265 -0.0785 0.0265
(0.0381)* (0.0273) (0.0381)* (0.0274) (0.0381)* (0.0273) (0.0380)* (0.0272)
Respondent has at least primary education 0.0717 0.0744 0.0703 0.0728
(0.0269)** (0.0270)** (0.0268)** (0.0270)**
Respondent has secondary education 0.0828 0.0828 0.0801 0.0794
(0.0396)* (0.0395)* (0.0393)* (0.0393)*
age 0.0375 0.0376 0.0387 0.0389
(0.0093)** (0.0093)** (0.0091)** (0.0091)**
(age/10) squared -0.0522 -0.0526 -0.0544 -0.0546
(0.0125)** (0.0125)** (0.0123)** (0.0123)**
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 2 0.0307 0.0167 0.0319 0.0173 0.0298 0.0192 0.0310 0.0198
(0.0216) (0.0207) (0.0217) (0.0207) (0.0216) (0.0208) (0.0216) (0.0208)
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 3 0.0647 0.0411 0.0715 0.0452 0.0636 0.0448 0.0705 0.0466
(0.0255)* (0.0230)+ (0.0262)** (0.0232)+ (0.0256)* (0.0232)+ (0.0262)** (0.0233)*
Constant -0.6800 0.0545 -0.6728 -0.6872 -0.6932
(0.1608)** (0.0578) (0.1608)** (0.1590)** (0.1585)**
N (number of women, each observed 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497
at three surveys)
Notes: 
p-values: + < .1; * < .05; ** < .01
Robust standard errors are used to account for potential heteroscedasticity (especially in the linear probability model). For OLS estimates these robust
standard errors additionally account for the correlation of residuals for the same individual across timtime periods.Table 6: Females -- linear probability models for currently using family planning with different assumptions about
the contraceptive use of network partners without detailed information in the KDICP survey
Method Fixed Fixed Fixed
Effects Effects Effects
Assumption about family planning use of network partners NWP > 4 are NWP > 4 are NWP > 4 are
without detailed information (i.e., the fifth and higher not fp users fp users distributed
network partner mentioned by the respondent) proportionally
a
# of nwp using family planning (fp), time t- (among network 0.0382
   partners with detailed information) (0.0097)**
# of nwp not using fp, time t-, assuming all nwp > 4 are not users -0.0040
(0.0039)
# of nwp using fp, time t-, assuming all nwp > 4 are users 0.0062
(0.0041)
# of nwp not using family planning (fp), time t- (among network -0.0244
   partners with detailed information) (0.0079)**
# of nwp using fp, time t-,  0.0132
   assuming proportional distribution of nwp > 4 (0.0053)*
# of nwp not using fp, time t-,  -0.0099
   assuming proportional distribution of nwp > 4 (0.0046)*
-0.0749 -0.0763 -0.0755
(0.0454)+ (0.0455)+ (0.0454)+
Children ever born, time t- 0.0083 0.0088 0.0090
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Respodent has radio, time t- 0.0239 0.0295 0.0292
(0.0263) (0.0261) (0.0264)
Respondent has metal roof, time t- -0.0686 -0.0689 -0.0732
(0.0374)+ (0.0380)+ (0.0386)+
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 2 0.0246 0.0282 0.0265
(0.0222) (0.0220) (0.0223)
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 3 0.0661 0.0729 0.0713
(0.0268)* (0.0271)** (0.0271)**
N (number of women, each observed 457 457 453
at three surveys)
Notes: 
p-values: + < .1; * < .05; ** < .01
(a) The network partners without detailed information are split into fp users and non-users according to the proportion
observed among the four network partners with detailed information for the respondent
Robust standard errors are used to account for potential heteroscedasticity (especially in the linear probability model).
For OLS estimates these robust standard errors additionally account for the
correlation of residuals for the same individual across time periodsTable 7: Females -- linear probability models for having ever-used family planning with different specifications of network partners’ family 
planning use. Respondent’s contraceptive use is measured at K1, K2 and K3. 
Method Fixed OLS Fixed OLS Fixed OLS Fixed OLS
Effects Effects Effects Effects
# of nwp using family planning (fp), time t- 0.0460 0.0873 0.0477 0.0946
(0.0096)** (0.0091)** (0.0105)** (0.0094)**
# of nwp not using family planning (fp), time t- 0.0033 0.0185
(0.0090) (0.0084)*
at least one fp user in network 0.0400 0.0767 0.0303 0.0580
(0.0276) (0.0272)** (0.0299) (0.0304)+
# number of remaining fp users in network 0.0484 0.0915 0.0536 0.1079
(0.0146)** (0.0144)** (0.0164)** (0.0162)**
at least one non-user in network 0.0289 0.0624
(0.0308) (0.0321)+
# number of remaining non-users in network -0.0058 0.0033
(0.0153) (0.0146)
dummy for not married, time t -0.0151 0.0373 -0.0150 0.0381 -0.0159 0.0369 -0.0165 0.0349
(0.0540) (0.0477) (0.0540) (0.0475) (0.0541) (0.0478) (0.0540) (0.0479)
children ever born, time t 0.0292 0.0175 0.0289 0.0167 0.0293 0.0176 0.0291 0.0167
(0.0127)* (0.0063)** (0.0127)* (0.0063)** (0.0127)* (0.0063)** (0.0127)* (0.0063)**
R has radio, time t 0.0388 0.0524 0.0386 0.0499 0.0392 0.0529 0.0394 0.0507
(0.0275) (0.0258)* (0.0275) (0.0257)+ (0.0276) (0.0257)* (0.0276) (0.0256)*
R has metal roof, time t -0.0732 0.0510 -0.0730 0.0492 -0.0726 0.0514 -0.0732 0.0497
(0.0387)+ (0.0333) (0.0387)+ (0.0331) (0.0389)+ (0.0334) (0.0389)+ (0.0331)
R has at least primary education 0.1359 0.1294 0.1356 0.1289
(0.0369)** (0.0369)** (0.0370)** (0.0370)**
R has secondary education 0.1299 0.1298 0.1292 0.1271
(0.0463)** (0.0462)** (0.0464)** (0.0463)**
age 0.0407 0.0404 0.0410 0.0413
(0.0133)** (0.0132)** (0.0132)** (0.0131)**
(age/10) squared -0.0555 -0.0547 -0.0561 -0.0559
(0.0184)** (0.0183)** (0.0183)** (0.0181)**
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 2 0.0637 0.0422 0.0634 0.0408 0.0640 0.0428 0.0640 0.0425
(0.0224)** (0.0221)+ (0.0225)** (0.0222)+ (0.0224)** (0.0221)+ (0.0225)** (0.0222)+
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 3 0.0640 0.0278 0.0621 0.0178 0.0645 0.0287 0.0619 0.0182
(0.0263)* (0.0258) (0.0274)* (0.0263) (0.0263)* (0.0259) (0.0274)* (0.0263)
Constant -0.8016 -0.8192 -0.8034 -0.8367
(0.2232)** (0.2224)** (0.2227)** (0.2202)**
N (number of women, each observed 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498
at three surveys)
Notes: 
p-values: + < .1; * < .05; ** < .01
Robust standard errors are used to account for potential heteroscedasticity (especially in the linear probability model). For OLS estimates these 
robust standard errors additionally account for the correlation of residuals for the same individual across time periodsTable 8: Females -- specification tests with current number of network partners (total or family planning users) 
as dependent variable and past family planning use as right-side variable 
Respondent’s contraceptive use is measured at K2 and K3, and the time of measurement is indicated by time t 
Past contraceptive use and individual characteristics at the preceding survey wave are indicated as time t - 1
Method OLS Fixed OLS Fixed
Effects Effects
Dependent Variable number of number of number of number of
network partners network partners network partners network partners
using fp using fp
Currently using family planning, time t - 1 0.6276 -0.0695 0.3612 -0.0096
(0.1416)** (0.1920) (0.1084)** (0.1415)
Dummy for not married, time t- -0.1415 -0.5593 -0.1032 -0.4562
(0.1532) (0.2442)* (0.1693) (0.2127)*
Dummy for not married, time t -1 0.5044 0.5309 0.2928 0.1647
(0.2592)+ (0.3191)+ (0.2528) (0.3605)
Children ever born, time t- 0.0671 0.0733 0.1261 0.1412
(0.0362)+ (0.0565) (0.0358)** (0.0557)*
Children ever born, time t - 1 -0.0604 -0.0818 -0.0987 -0.0875
(0.0381) (0.0697) (0.0399)* (0.0628)
Respondent has radio, time t- 0.1921 0.1691 0.2272 -0.1508
(0.0964)* (0.1489) (0.1131)* (0.1733)
Respondent has radio, time t - 1 0.0373 -0.0316 0.1417 -0.0584
(0.0910) (0.1393) (0.0996) (0.1433)
Respodent has metal roof, time t- 0.2128 -0.2106 0.1813 -0.3093
(0.1191)+ (0.1843) (0.1251) (0.1735)+
Respondent has metal roof, time t - 1 0.0041 -0.3320 0.0353 -0.2688
(0.1307) (0.2104) (0.1370) (0.1984)
Respondent has at least primary schooling 0.5222 0.6439
(0.1232)** (0.1476)**




(Age/10) squared -0.0763 -0.0442
(0.0655) (0.0730)
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 3 -0.1892 -0.0235 0.3550 0.5186
(0.0796)* (0.1139) (0.0808)** (0.1082)**
Constant -0.9319 0.9710
(0.8018) (0.8989)
N (number of women, each observed 497 497 497 497
at three surveys)
Notes: 
p-values: + < .1; * < .05; ** < .01
Robust standard errors are used to account for potential heteroscedasticity (especially in the linear probability model). 
For the OLS estimates these standard errors additionally account for the correlation of residuals 
for the same individual across time periodsTable 9: Males -- linear probability models for currently using family planning with different specifications of network partners’ family 
planning use. Respondent’s contraceptive use is measured at K1, K2 and K3. 
Method Fixed OLS Fixed OLS Fixed OLS Fixed OLS
Effects Effects Effects Effects
# of nwp using family planning (fp), time t- 0.0974 0.1268 0.0956 0.1252
(0.0131)** (0.0103)** (0.0135)** (0.0107)**
# of nwp not using family planning (fp), time t- -0.0034 -0.0040
(0.0093) (0.0078)
At least one fp user in network 0.1484 0.1469 0.1561 0.1595
(0.0428)** (0.0372)** (0.0454)** (0.0397)**
# number of remaining fp users in network 0.0777 0.1186 0.0719 0.1123
(0.0229)** (0.0198)** (0.0239)** (0.0206)**
At least one non-user in network -0.0238 -0.0324
(0.0446) (0.0417)
# number of remaining non-users in network 0.0015 0.0051
(0.0198) (0.0166)
Dummy for not married, time t- -0.1532 -0.0535 -0.1525 -0.0528 -0.1539 -0.0524 -0.1510 -0.0506
(0.0912)+ (0.0571) (0.0913)+ (0.0572) (0.0897)+ (0.0561) (0.0899)+ (0.0560)
Children ever born, time t- 0.0030 0.0010 0.0030 0.0010 0.0029 0.0011 0.0029 0.0009
(0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0020)
Respondent has radio, time t- 0.0182 0.0199 0.0180 0.0195 0.0207 0.0196 0.0201 0.0186
(0.0373) (0.0257) (0.0373) (0.0258) (0.0374) (0.0256) (0.0376) (0.0258)
Respondent has metal roof, time t- -0.0113 0.0299 -0.0100 0.0308 -0.0138 0.0296 -0.0117 0.0311
(0.0463) (0.0329) (0.0465) (0.0331) (0.0462) (0.0330) (0.0464) (0.0331)
Respondent has at least primary schooling 0.0751 0.0774 0.0735 0.0769
(0.0322)* (0.0328)* (0.0322)* (0.0328)*
Respondent has secondary schooling 0.0667 0.0681 0.0665 0.0679
(0.0346)+ (0.0348)* (0.0347)+ (0.0347)*
Age 0.0114 0.0112 0.0113 0.0112
(0.0060)+ (0.0060)+ (0.0060)+ (0.0060)+
(Age/10) squared -0.0128 -0.0127 -0.0127 -0.0127
(0.0059)* (0.0059)* (0.0059)* (0.0059)*
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 2 0.0457 0.0326 0.0459 0.0329 0.0437 0.0320 0.0441 0.0324
(0.0291) (0.0281) (0.0292) (0.0281) (0.0292) (0.0281) (0.0293) (0.0282)
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 3 0.0002 -0.0153 0.0016 -0.0135 -0.0009 -0.0157 0.0012 -0.0137
(0.0306) (0.0281) (0.0309) (0.0280) (0.0305) (0.0280) (0.0308) (0.0279)
Constant -0.2695 0.0810 -0.2604 -0.2708 -0.2586
(0.1474)+ (0.0389)* (0.1479)+ (0.1480)+ (0.1483)+
N (number of males, each observed 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324
at three surveys)
Notes: 
p-values: + < .1; * < .05; ** < .01
Robust standard errors are used to account for potential heteroscedasticity (especially in the linear probability model). For the OLS estimates these
robust standard errors additionally account for the correlation of residuals for the same individual across time periodsTable 10: Females -- linear regression for female respondent’s perceived risk of getting AIDS with different specifications of network partners’ 
risk perceptions, and linear probability model for variable whether the respondent has talked with spouse about AIDS. 
Respondent’s risk perception and communication with spouse are measured at K2 and K3. 
Method Fixed OLS Fixed OLS
Effects Effects
Dependent Variable Perceived Perceived Perceived Perceived
AIDS risk AIDS risk AIDS risk AIDS risk
# of nwps with moderate or high perceived 0.1742 0.1618
    risk, time t- (0.0318)** (0.0237)**
# of nwps with no or low perceived -0.0448 -0.0737
    risk, time t- (0.0286) (0.0212)**
at least one nwp with moderate or high  0.4213 0.3336
    perceived risk, time t- (0.0960)** (0.0752)**
# of remaining nwps with moderate or high 0.0641 0.0812
    perceived risk, time t- (0.0535) (0.0401)*
at least one nwp with no or low -0.1825 -0.1237
    perceived risk, time t- (0.0988)+ (0.0801)
# of remaining nwps with no or low -0.0079 -0.0646
    perceived risk, time t- (0.0467) (0.0356)+
Dummy for not married, time t- 0.1725 0.1894 0.1737 0.1952
(0.1814) (0.0976)+ (0.1814) (0.0975)*
Children ever born, time t- -0.0111 0.0115 -0.0135 0.0109
(0.0412) (0.0146) (0.0417) (0.0146)
Respondent has radio, time t- -0.1164 -0.0881 -0.1031 -0.0858
(0.1027) (0.0632) (0.1017) (0.0630)
Respondent has metal roof, time t- -0.0020 0.0430 -0.0159 0.0392
(0.1276) (0.0670) (0.1261) (0.0669)
Respondent has at least primary schooling 0.1417 0.1406
(0.0784)+ (0.0777)+




(Age/10) squared -0.0475 -0.0503
(0.0373) (0.0374)
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 3 -0.0190 -0.0206 -0.0282 -0.0312
(0.0617) (0.0528) (0.0618) (0.0528)
Constant 1.9248 1.8864
(0.4756)** (0.4778)**
N (number of women, each observed 545 545 545 545
at two surveys)
Notes: 
p-values: + < .1; * < .05; ** < .01
Robust standard errors are used to account for potential heteroscedasticity (especially in the linear probability model). For the OLS estimates these 
robust standard errors additionally account for the correlation of residuals for the same individual across time periodsTable A1: Females -- Comparison of characteristics of women who participate in all three waves of the KDIC survey as compared
to attritors, i.e., women who participate in at least one but not all three rounds
Women Attritors Women Attritors Women Attritors
in K1--K3 in K1--K3 in K1--K3
Females
N 497 414 497 231 497 387
Individual Characteristics
Age 29.96 27.31* 33.27 31.69*
-8.05 (7.63) (8.27) (8.56)
Not Married 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.13
Children ever born 5.13 3.70* 5.69 4.82* 6.23 4.20*
(3.14) (2.84) (3.14) (2.91) (2.93) (3.11)
Has radio 0.52 0.49 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.63
Has metal roof 0.23 0.16* 0.28 0.21* 0.44 0.36*
Has at least primary schooling 0.77 0.85* 0.78 0.82 0.77 0.89*
Has secondary or higher schooling 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.16*
Family planning variables, respondent
Proportion currently using family planning 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.13*
Proportion ever using family planning 0.24 0.22 0.34 0.27 0.34 0.29
Proportion wanting no more chidren 0.38 0.25* 0.42 0.32* 0.49 0.30*
Family planning (fp) network
Proportion with at least one nwp in fp network 0.72 0.78* 0.81 0.81 0.90 0.86*
Uncensored size of family planning network 2.80 2.96 3.88 3.96 4.88 4.28*
(2.73) (2.62) (3.63) (3.64) (4.09) (4.06)
Censored size of family planning network 2.15 2.32 2.53 2.57 2.97 2.65*
(1.64) (1.57) (1.53) (1.51) (1.35) (1.46)
Proportion with more than 4 network partners 0.23 0.24 0.33 0.34 0.41 0.33*
Prop. with at least one nwp fp user in network 0.45 0.52 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.58
Number of fp users in network (censored) 0.99 1.08 1.41 1.43 1.32 1.14*
(1.30) (1.31) (1.42) (1.36) (1.34) (1.24)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses; (*) indicates that difference between attritors and non-attritors is 
statistically significant at the 5% level
Kenya 1 Kenya 2 Kenya 3Table A2: BGLW test for attrition effects for females. OLS estimates of linear probability model 
for currently using contraception in Kenya 1, Kenya 2 and Kenya 3
Survey wave Kenya 1 Kenya 2 Kenya 3
Indicator for attritor -0.2050 -0.3474 -0.0909
(0.2717) (0.4449) (0.1833)
# of nwp using family planning (fp), time t- 0.0498 0.0735 0.0842
(0.0149)** (0.0214)** (0.0158)**
   Interaction of above variable with "attritor" 0.0093 -0.0153 0.0079
(0.0199) (0.0255) (0.0215)
# of nwp not using family planning (fp), time t- -0.0067 0.0171 0.0256
(0.0108) (0.0181) (0.0110)*
   Interaction of above variable with "attritor" 0.0019 -0.0253 -0.0254
(0.0146) (0.0212) (0.0154)+
Dummy for not married, time t- -- -0.0462 0.0362
(0.0979) (0.0537)
   Interaction of above variable with "attritor" -- 0.0253 -0.1284
(0.1184) (0.0688)+
Children ever born, time t- 0.0124 0.0054 0.0040
(0.0076) (0.0102) (0.0064)
   Interaction of above variable with "attritor" -0.0015 -0.0093 0.0046
(0.0105) (0.0122) (0.0094)
Respondent has radio, time t- -0.0416 -0.0135 -0.0339
(0.0289) (0.0490) (0.0348)
   Interaction of above variable with "attritor" 0.0793 0.0486 0.0651
(0.0414)$^+$ (0.0600) (0.0503)
Respondent has metal roof, time t- -0.0144 0.0525 0.0666
(0.0426) (0.0675) (0.0393)+
   Interaction of above variable with "attritor" -0.0035 -0.0100 -0.0357
(0.0604) (0.0805) (0.0534)
Respondent has at least primary schooling 0.0633 0.0905 0.0643
(0.0440) (0.0469)+ (0.0503)
   Interaction of above variable with "attritor" -0.0187 -0.0488 -0.0154
(0.0616) (0.0632) (0.0666)
Respondent has secondary schooling 0.0390 0.0998 0.0470
(0.0486) (0.0871) (0.0511)
   Interaction of above variable with "attritor" -0.0325 0.0339 0.1136
(0.0741) (0.1073) (0.0825)
Age 0.0241 0.0073 0.0069
(0.0113)* (0.0214) (0.0051)
   Interaction of above variable with "attritor" 0.0133 0.0238 0.0012
(0.0176) (0.0259) (0.0074)
(Age/10) squared -0.0402 -0.0122 -0.0057
(0.0169)* (0.0295) (0.0053)
   Interaction of above variable with "attritor" -0.0217 -0.0270 0.0000
(0.0264) (0.0354) (0.0075)
Constant -0.3498 -0.1802 -0.2476
(0.1753)* (0.3679) (0.1056)*
N 911 728 884
test-statistic of F-test that all interaction 0.57 0.66 1.18
variables are zero (df in parentheses) ( 9, 891) (10, 706) (10, 862)
Notes: 
p-values: + < .1; * < .05; ** < .01
Robust standard errors are used to account for potential heteroscedasticity in the linear probability modelTable A3: Females -- fixed effect and random effect logit models for currently using family planning with different specifications of  
network partners’ family planning use. Respondent’s contraceptive use is measured at K1, K2 and K3. 
Method Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Eff. Random Eff.
Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
# of nwp using family planning (fp), time t- 0.2877 0.5169 0.2402 0.4963
(0.0806)** (0.0652)** (0.0941)* (0.0750)**
# of nwp not using family planning (fp), time t- -0.1023 -0.0457
(0.1060) (0.0838)
At least one fp user in network 0.7160 0.6056 0.6890 0.4884
(0.3000)* (0.2454)* (0.3194)* (0.2598)+
# number of remaining fp users in network 0.1575 0.4907 0.0710 0.4898
(0.1178) (0.0953)** (0.1431) (0.1121)**
At least one non-user in network 0.0146 0.2686
(0.3021) (0.2357)
# number of remaining non-users in network -0.2231 -0.1936
(0.1615) (0.1292)
Dummy for not married, time t- -0.6492 -0.6389 -0.6296 -0.6396 -0.6038 -0.6368 -0.5865 -0.6619
(0.5152) (0.4081) (0.5119) (0.4085) (0.5179) (0.4085) (0.5176) (0.4098)
Children ever born, time t- 0.1111 0.0627 0.1218 0.0641 0.1045 0.0625 0.1203 0.0646
(0.1207) (0.0474) (0.1213) (0.0475) (0.1211) (0.0475) (0.1218) (0.0475)
Respondent has radio, time t- 0.4386 0.3811 0.4339 0.3856 0.4073 0.3764 0.3914 0.3748
(0.2992) (0.2032)+ (0.2997) (0.2036)+ (0.3000) (0.2039)+ (0.3012) (0.2038)+
Respondent has metal roof, time t- -0.7074 0.0874 -0.7004 0.0925 -0.7138 0.0819 -0.7268 0.0754
(0.3676)+ (0.2188) (0.3700)+ (0.2192) (0.3659)* (0.2196) (0.3714)* (0.2200)
Respondent has at least primary schooing 0.8259 0.8404 0.8297 0.8479
(0.3064)** (0.3082)** (0.3072)** (0.3085)**
Respondent has secondary schooling 0.6042 0.6065 0.6110 0.6145
(0.2822)* (0.2828)* (0.2835)* (0.2832)*
Age 0.4160 0.4166 0.4137 0.4135
(0.1143)** (0.1144)** (0.1146)** (0.1144)**
(Age/10) squared -0.5909 -0.5924 -0.5868 -0.5854
(0.1619)** (0.1621)** (0.1624)** (0.1620)**
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 2 0.3610 0.2124 0.3550 0.2134 0.3475 0.2090 0.3351 0.2084
(0.2347) (0.2147) (0.2345) (0.2148) (0.2362) (0.2151) (0.2364) (0.2149)
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 3 0.6318 0.4482 0.6648 0.4667 0.6012 0.4428 0.6328 0.4517
(0.2897)* (0.2243)* (0.2926)* (0.2271)* (0.2922)* (0.2250)* (0.2957)* (0.2277)*
Constant -11.3573 -11.3060 -11.3635 -11.3545
(1.9897)** (1.9934)** (1.9931)** (1.9914)**
N (number of women, each observed 156 497 156 497 156 497 156 497
at three surveys)
Notes: 
p-values: + < .1; * < .05; ** < .01
Fixed effect logit model is based only on individuals who change their contraceptive behavior at least once between Kenya 1 and Kenya 3; women with
constant contraceptive use in all three survey waves are dropped in the estimationTable A4: Males -- fixed effect and random effect logit models for currently using family planning with different specifications of network 
partners’ family planning use. Respondent’s contraceptive use is measured at K1, K2 and K3. 
Method Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Eff. Random Eff.
Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
# of nwp using family planning (fp), time t- 0.6029 0.7718 0.6186 0.7791
(0.0956)** (0.0722)** (0.1180)** (0.0831)**
# of nwp not using family planning (fp), time t- 0.0266 0.0153
(0.1163) (0.0851)
At least one family planning user in network 1.5320 1.4414 1.5682 1.5178
(0.3806)** (0.2771)** (0.4136)** (0.3005)**
# number of remaining fp users in network 0.3198 0.5599 0.2972 0.5234
(0.1395)* (0.1063)** (0.1682)+ (0.1241)**
At least one non-user in network -0.0964 -0.1893
(0.3321) (0.2677)
# number of remaining non-users in network 0.0108 0.0333
(0.1824) (0.1411)
Dummy for not married, time t- -2.0669 -0.9034 -2.0608 -0.9061 -2.3048 -0.9135 -2.2927 -0.9065
(1.3665) (0.9341) (1.3580) (0.9336) (1.5915) (0.9455) (1.6037) (0.9484)
Children ever born, time t- 0.2307 0.0112 0.2296 0.0113 0.2131 0.0138 0.2128 0.0130
(0.1022)* (0.0242) (0.1023)* (0.0243) (0.1029)* (0.0245) (0.1034)* (0.0245)
Respondent has radio, time t- 0.3919 0.2415 0.3933 0.2426 0.4867 0.2341 0.4873 0.2268
(0.3390) (0.2281) (0.3391) (0.2282) (0.3517) (0.2303) (0.3513) (0.2303)
Respondent has metal roof, time t- -0.2993 0.2304 -0.3061 0.2280 -0.4638 0.2188 -0.4665 0.2258
(0.4199) (0.2435) (0.4208) (0.2439) (0.4343) (0.2460) (0.4359) (0.2460)
Respondent has at least primary schooling 0.9056 0.9005 0.8610 0.8786
(0.5074)+ (0.5086)+ (0.5132)+ (0.5131)+
Respondent has secondary schooling 0.4534 0.4485 0.4458 0.4538
(0.2319)* (0.2334)+ (0.2340)+ (0.2353)+
Age 0.1112 0.1118 0.1080 0.1067
(0.0618)+ (0.0619)+ (0.0621)+ (0.0620)+
(Sge/10) squared -0.1318 -0.1323 -0.1278 -0.1266
(0.0670)* (0.0671)* (0.0673)+ (0.0672)+
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 2 0.2841 0.2830 0.2861 0.2823 0.2969 0.2639 0.2928 0.2646
(0.2649) (0.2332) (0.2653) (0.2333) (0.2706) (0.2352) (0.2709) (0.2351)
Dummy for survey wave Kenya 3 -0.2690 -0.1303 -0.2772 -0.1357 -0.2724 -0.1478 -0.2651 -0.1426
(0.3382) (0.2522) (0.3400) (0.2540) (0.3418) (0.2535) (0.3437) (0.2556)
Constant -6.0591 -6.0967 -6.1928 -6.1074
(1.4580)** (1.4736)** (1.4700)** (1.4820)**
N (number of males, each observed 133 324 133 324 133 324 133 324
at three surveys)
Notes: 
p-values: + < .1; * < .05; ** < .01
Fixed effect logit model is based only on individuals who change their contraceptive behavior at least once between Kenya 1 and Kenya 3; women with
constant contraceptive use in all three survey waves are dropped in the estimation